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I. INTRODUCTION
August 1988 marked the sixth anniversary of the "Latin
American debt crisis."' This crisis has burdened Latin American
1. Mexico's announcement in August 1982 that it would be unable to meet its loan
obligations triggered the so-called "debt crisis" in Latin America. From 1983 through 1986,
$243.1 billion of debt was renegotiated among developing countries and both banks and
official creditors. Latin American debt represented a significant portion of this amount. See
INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTR'N AND DEV., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEV. REP. 1987: BARRIERS TO
ADJUSTMENT AND GROWTH IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND FOREIGN TRADE
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATIONS 20-21 (1987) [hereinafter WORLD BANK 1987]; Kuczynski,
The Outlook for Latin American Debt, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 129 (1987) [hereinafter Outlook];
Sachs & Huizinga, U.S. Commercial Banks and the Developing-Country Debt Crisis, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcrrvITY 555 (W. Brainard & G. Perry eds. 1987).
1988] DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS 33
governments, private citizens, and corporations with debt obliga-
tions estimated at $388 billion2 owed to banks and governments in
the industrialized world, and has posed a constant threat to both
the continued growth of the developing world and to the stability
of the international banking system. Accordingly, the substantial
fear of slowed interest payments' and default has forced major
creditors to search for alternatives designed to ensure maximum
repayment of these loan obligations."
The innovation of the debt-equity swap,5 whereby external
2. This figure constitutes the external debt of the 22 Latin American member countries
of the Inter-American Development Bank as of December 31, 1986. This external debt fig-
ure takes into account long-term private debt (i.e., debt with repayment exceeding one
year), long-term public debt, and short-term debt (i.e., debt with repayment of one year or
less). INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1987 REP.
33-39 (1987).
More recently, the World Bank calculated the total external debt for 27 Latin American
and Caribbean nations to be $442 billion. INTERN'L BANK FOR RECONST'R. & DEV., WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES: VOLUME 1, ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY TABLES 18 (1988-1989 ed.)
[hereinafter DEBT TABLES 1988].
3. See Outlook, supra note 1, at 140. The author identifies several reasons for the bur-
den of paying interest on the external debt. These are:
(1) the shortage of external capital flows, which has made it necessary to main-
tain large trade surpluses and to keep imports and thus economic growth down;
(2) the lack of growth itself, combined with persistently high inflation in several
major economies; (3) the unfavorable outlook for traditional exports as well as
the increasing threat of protectionism to more recent manufactured exports; and
(4) the very large fiscal burden of servicing the debt, which puts pressure on
governments to raise taxes, most of which are indirect and thus inflationary in
their initial application.
Id.
As of mid-1987, eight Latin American countries had unilaterally halted or reduced debt
service. Latin Debt Update: Innovations Arise but Old Problems Remain, 1987 Bus. LAT.
AM. 161. Note that banks are required to place loans on non-accrual status when interest
payments are 90 days late, thereby recognizing income when interest payments are received
rather than earned, as under the accrual basis. Pollack, 3 Banks Reclassify Brazil Debt,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at Dl, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
4. One economist, Howard J. Wiarda, has commented that it is inconceivable that
Latin America can ever pay this debt back, and "no one believes seriously that the debt can
or will ever be paid back in full." Marlowe, Foreign Loans Not Likely To Be Paid Back,
Tampa Tribune, May 27, 1987, at ID, col. C. Accordingly, some bank creditors have consid-
ered forgiving a portion of these troubled loans as a form of debt management.
5. The term "debt-equity swap" is a short-hand term that has been used to describe
what should more appropriately be called "debt conversion." As part III of this article ex-
plains, debt may be converted not only into equity or direct investment, but also into debtor
country currency. The authors will attempt to be as specific as possible in their use of terms,
but regret that the term debt-equity swap has become such a catch-all phrase that its mis-
use has become commonplace among many commentators. To this extent, an occasional lack
of precision becomes unavoidable. See, e.g., Roberts & Remolona, Debt Swaps: A Technique
in Developing Country Finance, in FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18-19 (R. Debs ed.
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debt obligations are purchased at a substantial discount and con-
verted into domestic obligations, has become one of the most at-
tractive debt management alternatives to emerge from the debt
crisis.' Transactions initially were limited and confined to portfolio
swaps between commercial banks. Recently, though, not only has
the debt-equity swap market become well organized, but trading
volume also has grown, and the participation and variety of trans-
actions has significantly increased.7 Although debt-equity swaps
are no panacea to the debt crisis, they are expected to reduce Latin
America's debt burden by approximately 10%. 8
In general, debt-equity swaps represent an attempt on the
part of a debtor country to retire some of its debt and to minimize
the heavy burden of payments of interest and principal by swap-
ping an external obligation for a domestic obligation. This, it is
hoped, will encourage new investment in the debtor country's
economy. In order to meet these objectives, each debtor country
wishing to participate in debt-equity swaps must develop its own
program requirements. These requirements must be consistent
with the country's goals of ameliorating its debt burden and gener-
ating new investment. At the same time, the unique character of
each country's debt-equity program provides the potential investor
with an opportunity to select appropriate investment climates,
levels of risk, and restrictions which best suit the investor's needs.
This article will survey the Latin American debt-equity re-
1987). For a further discussion of this problem, see WORLD BANK 1987, supra note 1, at 22.
6. Professor Alan Meltzer, of Carnegie-Mellon University, is considered to be the first
proponent of having debtor countries exchange debt for equity as a means of retiring debt
obligations. Meltzer, A Way to Defuse the World Debt Bomb, FORTUNE, Nov. 28, 1983, at
137.
7. See Orme, Trading Latin Debts: Has the Secondary Market Come of Age?, LATIN
FINANCE, Oct. 1988, at 39 ([I]n 1983 bankers bought and sold half a billion dollars in third
world and East European debts at rates well below the paper's face value .... In 1987
volume topped $10 billion and profits an estimated $100 million). See also Peagam, On the
Edge of a New Wave, EUROMONFY, Mar. 1988, at 147. ("The Latin American debt market
will continue to expand this year, as both debtors and creditors seek new ways out of the
debt morass. . . . Trading volume should grow as the five-year-old market becomes more
sophisticated and as creditor banks manage their Latin American exposure more actively.")
8. It was estimated that over $12 billion of developing country debt was swapped
through 1987 by debt-equity programs, most of which was from Latin America. Roberts &
Remolona, supra note 5, at 19. As of March 1988, Chile has reduced its total external debt
by approximately $2.9 billion, representing about 10% of its foreign debt, since launching its
debt-equity program in May 1985. See Peagam, supra note 7. Specific figures, however, are
difficult to compile since prices are negotiated and there is no central trading floor or report-
ing system. Forecasts for volume in 1988 were placed unofficially at between $12 billion and
$25 billion. Id.
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gimes and consider them in light of major international trends,
namely, as responses to recent shifts in patterns of international
finance, and as attempts to facilitate growth in Latin American
debtor countries while preserving the stability of the international
banking system. Part II will discuss the economic motivations be-
hind debt-equity swaps from the perspectives of the major partici-
pants in the transaction. Part III will provide an overview of the
mechanics of a debt-equity swap and compare it with other debt
conversion alternatives. Part IV will provide a detailed and com-
parative analysis of Latin American nations which have active
debt-equity programs. Part V will address the direct and indirect
effects of debt-equity swaps on the program participants. Finally,
Part VI will analyze the United States regulatory environment and
the way in which it may promote or constrain debt-equity swaps.
We conclude that debt-equity swaps offer a limited opportunity to
reduce foreign debt obligations and promote direct investment, but
that existing regulations nevertheless should be coordinated and
liberalized to encourage participation in these programs.
II. PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT-EQUITY SwAPs
Debt-equity swaps, by definition, involve a shift from debt fi-
nance to equity finance. 9 To the extent that this shift to equity
finance is designed to maximize debt retirement in the midst of
economic uncertainty, many Latin American countries consider it
to be a desirable alternative at this stage of the debt crisis. The
proliferation of these programs reveals a great deal about the eco-
nomic incentives that control the calculus of debt repayment and
potentially could offer an insight into the proper role of public and
governmental agencies in ameliorating the debt crisis. 0
9. Financing obtained through bank lending, official finance, or bonds represents debt
finance. When a country engages in debt finance, the debtor must repay the face value of
the loan, including interest, regardless of its future inability to repay the loan. Equity fi-
nance, however, encompassing direct investment, has a different set of effects on the debtor.
In the case of direct investment, the foreign owners of the investment have a claim only to a
share of the investment's earnings. Unlike debt finance, the foreign shareholders do not
have a claim to a periodic stream of fixed payments and, accordingly, adverse economic
events affect only the output of the investment. In the case of debt finance, a failing eco-
nomic condition does not minimize the responsibility of the debtor to meet its payment
obligations. P. KRUGMAN & M. OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMICS 591 (1987) [hereinafter
KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD].
10. It is important to distinguish the economic rationale behind debt-equity swaps from
the standpoint of the participants of the swap, which is discussed in this section, from the
desirability of the swaps in a macroeconomic sense, which is discussed in section V, infra.
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In order to appreciate more fully the economic impulseswhich
have led to the widespread adoption of debt-equity programs, it is
necessary first to explain in detail the objectives of the three major
groups of players in the debt-equity swap process - the debtor
countries, the creditor banks, and the investors. The government
of the creditor, a fourth major creditor, has the ability to generate
or discourage the use of these swaps through a wide range of policy
tools; the role of the government will be discussed in Section VI by
analyzing the regulatory response of the United States govern-
ment, the principal regulator of a majority of the investors in debt-
equity swaps.11 By focusing attention on the underlying economic
rationale of swaps, it is hoped that creditor and debtor countries
will be sensitive to the economic realities that underlie the policy
debate as they formulate their policies.
A. The Lending Environment
Debt-equity swaps must be understood as a reaction to the
dominant model of debt finance and involuntary lending that has
evolved over the last decade.12 As the Latin American debtor coun-
Although this distinction becomes blurred when one looks at the economic rationale of the
debtor country for participating in the swap, it is an important distinction to make. To the
extent that the incentive to participate in a swap may be greater for one participant than
another, this may result in a swap where the terms and conditions contribute little to the
economic health of the host country, which nevertheless may approve the swap because of
the mistaken belief that all swaps are desirable.
11. Any discussion of governments' role in the debt crisis would be incomplete without
a consideration of the desirability of regulatory reform not related to the debt-equity pro-
cess occurring within the debtor countries. The literature concerning the need for Latin
American countries to liberalize their economic policies to generate growth and foreign in-
vestment is extensive, and warrants separate treatment. The literature which calls for a
stronger state presence in the economy as a desirable solution to the region's economic ills is
equally extensive. Nevertheless, a country's investment climate is the sum of many factors,
and it would be remiss not to include in our analysis these concerns where they are most
appropriate.
12. Involuntary, or forced, lending is the increase in the exposure of a bank to a bor-
rowing country that is in debt servicing difficulty and that, because of the corresponding loss
of its credit rating, would not be able to attract new lending from banks that are not already
exposed to that country. Thus, banks which have outstanding loans to these debtor coun-
tries lend the countries new money so that they may meet their old obligations. See W.
CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE STABILITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 74 (1983). Bank
lending during the 1970s, wherein banks recycled their vast holdings of "petro dollars" to
the developing world at low rates of interest, was the first act in the sequence which
culminated in the involuntary lending cycle. The reliance on bank lending, as opposed to
debt financing through bonds, for example, largely can be traced to the relative advantages
of bank borrowing in financing development, and not the specific events of the decade which
made the supply of credit easily available. More specifically, bank financing was much
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tries experience greater difficulty in servicing their present loan ob-
ligations, however, and become more unwilling to commit to more
debt, the popularity of debt conversion schemes increases. Debt
conversion schemes, as noted, relieve the burdens caused by the
interest and principal payments by matching repayment to the ec-
onomic success of the equity investment and thus help control the
tremendous net outflow of resources from debtor to creditor.13 In
comparison to the "involuntary lending" solution of using new
loans to help facilitate the repayment of old loans, this conversion
approach recognizes that interest and principal repayment without
new lending is speculative at best. Debtor countries, to their ad-
vantage, also relieve some immediate obligations in return for ex-
tended repayment periods under the terms of a conversion plan. In
debt-equity swaps, the repayment period is controlled by the pro-
visions of the debt-equity program rather than by the underlying
cheaper during the 1970s than its alternatives. Additionally, the ease with which banks
would reschedule loans embodied a flexibility that was advantageous to the debtor country.
The general obligation nature of the lending, and the concentration of lending in the hands
of a few banks, also served to provide a mechanism of enforcement which encouraged bank
lending. Nevertheless, the inability of bank loans to correspond to shifting economic condi-
tions, the general obligation nature of the loans which fails to link repayment with the suc-
cess of the project for which the money was loaned, and the effect undermining local capital
markets all contribute to the inability of the debtor countries to repay their loans. This
difficulty in repayment, when coupled with the concentration of outstanding obligations to a
few banks, generated the cycle of new loans to repay interest on outstanding obligations,
thereby creating a process of involuntary lending. For a description of the events leading up
to this involuntary lending cycle, see D. LESSARD & J. WILLIAMSON, FINANCIAL IN-
TERMEDIARIES BEYOND THE DEBT CRIsIS 40-45 (1985). See also infra notes 22-24 and accom-
panying text.
Of course, the concept of involuntary lending is not peculiar to an international debt
system. Lenders often find it necessary to extend additional credit to non-paying debtors in
order to meet their existing obligations, thereby improving the creditors' position. See gen-
erally, Lopucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy
System, 1982 Wisc. L. REV. 311, 336-38 (1982).
13. Outlook, supra note 1, at 144; supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. The under-
lying theory of simultaneously injecting new capital and retiring debt is supported by recent
government studies. For example, at a December 1, 1986 "congressional summit" on trade
and debt issues, U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter called on poor nations "to re-
duce the role of government in their economies." Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III
warned that new private investment is unlikely unless it is "combined with vital market-
oriented policy changes." Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead said that "contin-
ued borrowing is not the long-term answer to growth in the lesser developed countries. The
answer is increased equity investment." This means that poor nations should sell state-run
enterprises, swear off economic planning, allow U.S. banks full access to local financial mar-
kets, and generally eliminate laws or regulations that limit foreign investment. Debt-equity
swaps are a device in vogue which satisfies these twin objectives. Ganitsky & Lema, Foreign
Investment Through Debt-Equity Swaps, SLOAN MGMT. REV. 21, 27-28 (Wntr. 1988).
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loan agreement."
B. The Debtor Country's Perspective
The debtor country, when considering its debt strategy, faces
a range of options extending from default to repayment under the
present terms of its loan agreements. Within this range, renegoti-
ation of existing loans and debt conversion present the most popu-
lar alternatives, as do the new innovations outlined in Part III."5
From the standpoint of the debtor country, the relative desirability
of these alternatives must be addressed in light of two noncontro-
versial objectives that would appear to apply to all Latin American
countries - the retirement of external debt obligations and the
preservation of capital flows.16
Debt conversions have become popular among Latin American
countries because they offer palatable alternatives to either default
or repayment under present conditions, which would be problem-
atic for the debtor country. Although default theoretically repre-
sents the most attractive short-term alternative for countries wish-
ing to retire debt obligations, it is not without its costs. For
example, default may result in the seizure of the debtor's assets,
the exclusion of the debtor country from future borrowing, and the
reduction of any possible gains from trade that might have bene-
fited the country.17 The debtor country must weigh these costs
against the benefits of default, which primarily involve the elimi-
14. For a discussion on repatriation restrictions, see infra notes 115-29 and accompany-
ing text.
15. In addition to the analysis which focuses on the relative costs and benefits of de-
fault and continued repayment discussed herein, Sachs and Huizinga also consider the ef-
fects of maintaining the status quo. The mere presence of a debt can harm both the creditor
and debtor. First, protracted renegotiation of the debt can be very costly. Second, any possi-
ble disruption of the negotiations could result in the fear of a possible default, which would
provoke the same response as an actual default. Third, the debt can stifle economic reform
within the debtor country. Presently, any economic gains from reform flow directly into the
coffers of the creditor banks; this process serves as a significant disincentive to reform and
fuels whatever significant political opposition there may be to the reforms. Sachs & Hui-
zinga, supra note 1, at 595.
16. No long-term solution to the debt problem is possible without a mixture of eco-
nomic reform in the debtor countries and additional fresh capital, both of which are needed
to revive economic growth. See generally B. BALASSA, G. BuENo, P. KUCZYNSKI & M. SIMON-
SEN, TOWARD RENEWED ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA (1986). For the development of
these objectives as the overriding concern of Latin America, see generally, R. MATTIONE & T.
ENDERS, LATIN AMERICA - THE CRISIS OF DEBT AND GROWTH (1984).
17. See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 9, at 605-06; infra note 21.
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nation of the payment obligation on interest and principal. 8
The debtor country must approach continued repayment
under present terms and conditions with equal caution. Declining
levels of trade coupled with increased interest payments make this
position untenable for most debtor countries.1 9 Renegotiation of
existing loans or the infusion of new loans merely delays the even-
tual repayment, and does little to address the problem that the
debtor countries' current accounts are insufficient to sustain eco-
nomic growth and continue interest payments. Furthermore, Latin
American leaders and economists, as well as their counterparts in
developed countries, strongly oppose any suggestion that further
cuts be made in the standard of living in order to fulfill commit-
ments to foreign banks.2 0 Nevertheless, defaulting on the loans cre-
ates the distinct possibility that the debtor will be the subject of
economic ostracism from the outside world."1
As noted, this impasse has resulted in the phenomenon of in-
voluntary lending, where banks continue to lend money to the
debtor countries so that they may continue to meet their interest
payments and avoid default on outstanding loans;" however, the
involuntary lending does not respond to fundamental issues that
need to be addressed by both the creditor banks and the debtor
governments. It is a short-term palliative designed to create the
appearance of tranquility, 2  but it does little to encourage new
lending for purposes other than repayment. New debt continually
18. KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 9, at 606-07.
19. Total long-term debt as a percentage of gross national product and as a percentage
of exports of goods and services has increased dramatically among the Latin American coun-
tries. See Irr'L BANK FOR RECONST'R. & DEV., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEV. REP. 1988 256-57
(Table 18) (1988).
20. Recent protests in Venezuela over higher prices generated by an economic austerity
program reveal the dramatic upheaval that can accompany economic reform in Latin
America. See Mann, Troops Move to Halt Price Riots in Venezuela, Fin. Times, Mar. 1,
1989, at 1, col. 6. See also Rohter, Latin Chiefs Urge Overhaul of Debt and of O.A.S. Too,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 4 (nat'l ed.) (Presidents of eight Latin American coun-
tries demanding ceiling on repayment of foreign debt).
21. See also Outlook, supra note 1, at 130 ("following this path means that their econo-
mies would gradually become disconnected from the international financial system; credit
would be difficult if not impossible to obtain, and foreign trade would be reduced to bare
essentials").
22. See supra note 12.
23. If a bank is merely making loans to fund the interest payments on an otherwise
uncollectible loan, then the current earnings are illusory. Conway & Siegenthaler, Loan Loss
Reserves: Tax, Regulatory, and Adequacy Issues, J. Cobc BANK LENDING, Sep. 1987, at 4, 9.
This charade does not make the banks any healthier, which is reflected through reduced
stock prices. See Meltzer, supra note 6, at 139.
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is being created, rather than old debt being retired in the involun-
tary lending cycle, and banks without a significant exposure in
Latin America shy away from lending the debtor country new debt
funds.24 Debtor countries thus feel the need for new investment
mechanisms that attract new investment without exacerbating a
repayment problem that already has pushed many Latin American
countries to their economic limit.
The debt-equity swap responds to this financial impasse by
linking repayment to economic success.25 In the event of economic
hardship, the shareholder of the equity investment, not the debtor
country, feels the pain of economic decline.2 The debtor country
thus views this solution in no-lose terms. Additionally, the foreign
or domestic investor is provided with a real incentive for bringing
new capital into the debtor country through the purchase of debt
on the secondary market at a significant discount.2 Together, the
actions of the investor and the host country help satisfy the debtor
country's dual objectives of debt retirement and capital inflow.
C. The Creditor Banks' Perspective
The debt-equity swap presents the creditor bank with a
unique opportunity to either sell off its debt instruments on the
secondary market and rid itself of a particular country's debt, ac-
quire more of a particular country's debt and strengthen its hand
in future debt renegotiations, or transform its position from a
holder of debt to a holder of equity.2 8 The desire to achieve one of
these objectives results in a decision that contributes to the supply
side of the secondary debt market. In addition to the various regu-
latory incentives and constraints that influence the banks' deci-
sions,29 these transfers of sovereign debt may prove to be desirable
24. Of further interest, U.S. bank exposure to debtor countries has fallen, in absolute
dollars, from 1982-86. See Sachs & Huizinga, supra note 1, at 565-67.
25. See supra notes 12-13.
26. For a discussion of the disadvantages to creditor banks, see infra notes 170-82.
27. For a discussion of the advantages to investors, see infra notes 150-53 and accompa-
nying text.
28. It is important to distinguish the bank as an intermediary in the debt-equity trans-
action from the bank as a supplier or seller of debt in the transaction. Many banks actively
serve as intermediaries in debt-equity swaps, with fees ranging from one percent to four
percent of face value. In these instances, the bank's role is that of a broker. Roberts &
Remolona, supra note 5, at 20.
29. For example, banking regulations which require a minimum ratio of primary capital
(at book value) deter banks from selling their debt claims on the secondary market. This
problem can occur when banks increase loan loss reserves, which involves a shift from stock-
[Vol. 20:1
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to those banks which no longer have confidence in the present debt
repayment and rescheduling regime. Rather than involuntarily
lending new money to the debtor country to enable that country to
repay old obligations,30 the bank participating in a debt-equity
swap can focus on loaning new money to more creditworthy bor-
rowers, or can assume an equity position potentially yielding
greater returns. At the same time, if the bank does sell off its debt,
the new purchaser of the debt will transform that obligation into
new investment in the Latin American country.
The negative effect of carrying the risky debt on its books also
may motivate the creditor bank to sell its debt on the secondary
market. To the extent that a particular bank's exposure to Latin
American countries reflects a significant risk of non-repayment,
any indication of possible declines in the repayment position of the
Latin American countries has a negative effect on the stock prices
of these banks, which makes it more difficult for them to raise cap-
holders' equity and, therefore, is merely a cosmetic move and does not affect banks' cash
flow. The increase in these unallocated reserves immediately reduces reported net income
but not taxable income; this reduction otherwise would not occur until such time as the
loans would be written off, if ever. When the bank subsequently writes off troubled loans by
charging the loan loss account, its capital base and taxable income is then reduced, without
affecting reported income. Since U.S. bank regulators formerly counted loan loss reserves as
part of primary capital, however, an increase in this reserve did not affect measured primary
capital. This approach could have possibly jeopardized the bank's freedom if the decline in
book value was large enough to cause the bank to fall below regulatory limits on this ratio.
Sachs & Huizinga, supra note 1, at 570, 572-73, 588.
In December 1987, 12 countries, including the United States, announced their inten-
tions to increase capital requirements and link them to the riskiness of a bank's assets,
which would include foreign loans. This would further the dilemma of creditor banks hold-
ing substantial portions of risky Latin American debt, and possibly restrict the supply of
debt obligations in the secondary market. See Nash, 12 Countries Want Banks to Increase
Capital, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l. ed.). On December 16, 1988, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board adopted as final these requirements. Fed Adopts Risk-Based Capital
Guidelines; Will Also Propose Minimum Leverage Ratios, BNA's Banking Rep. (BNA) at 4
(Jan. 2, 1989). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued its final guidelines on
Jan. 19, 1989, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was expected to follow shortly
with guidelines of its own. OCC Issues Final Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, Will Adopt
Leverage Ratio, BNA's Banking Rep. (BNA) at 213 (Jan. 30, 1989).
To the extent that these risk-based capital regulations reduce the role that loan-loss
reserves play in calculations of capital by excluding loan-loss reserves from its definition of
"Tier 1 capital" and requiring that Tier 1 capital equal four percent of assets (total capital,
including the "Tier 2 capital" that includes loan-loss reserves, must equal eight percent of
risk-weighed assets), banks may be encouraged to shed a greater share of their debt to re-
duce the riskness of their portfolio. See generally DEBT TABLES 1988, supra note 2, at xxx-
xxxi.
30. See supra note 12.
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ital.31 Banks able to sell their loans for more than they are valued
by the stock market thus stand to gain from such a transaction.
The rationale behind this transfer of a riskier asset with a higher
face value for a safer asset with a lower face value applies regard-
less of the form of the new asset, 2 which may be cash, bonds, an
equity interest, or any other form of marketable security."
D. The Investors' Perspective
The motivation of the investor in the debt-equity swap, re-
gardless of whether the investor is a private individual, multina-
tional corporation, or bank, 4 appears to be the easiest to appreci-
ate. By purchasing debt on the secondary market at a discount and
then reselling it at a higher price, the investor is financing an in-
vestment at a discount." Assuming that the investor would have
made an identical expenditure in the absence of the swap program,
the difference between the purchase price and the redemption rate
represents the net savings to the investor.
At first glance the investor appears to be in an ideal situation
when participating in a swap, but the removal of the assumption
that the investor would have made the investment in the absence
of the program generates an entirely different analysis.3 6 Invest-
ment in Latin American countries never has been free from eco-
nomic and political risks, and successful participation in most eq-
uity investments requires that a wide range of variables be
31. See generally Sachs & Huizinga, supra note 1, at 576-87. It is important to recog-
nize this difficulty since an increase in capital/asset ratios might require a bank to enter the
capital markets itself.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Note that the commercial bank creditors, who hold the external debt obligations,
typically are not the investors in the domestic asset under debt conversion programs be-
cause most of these banks wish to sever the debtor-creditor relationship with these finan-
cially troubled nations, and possibly because of unfavorable U.S. regulatory restrictions. See
World Bank, Report on Chilean Debt Conversion, with Chilean Rules on Investments With
Foreign Debt Instruments and Provision in a Debt Restructuring Agreement for Such In-
vestments, 26 I.L.M. 819, 827 (1987) [hereinafter Chilean Report]. See also supra notes 29-
31.
35. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (discussing advantages to investors).
36. Some commentators gauge the success of a debt-equity program by the degree of
"additionality" that the program produces. "Additionality" represents the additional invest-
ment that is induced by the introduction of the new debt-equity guidelines, or investment
that would not have taken place but for the new regulations. W. CLINE, MOBILIZING BANK
LENDING TO DEBTOR Cou!rmus 47 (1987) [hereinafter MOBILIZING]; Roberts & Remolona,
supra note 5, at 28.
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considered. Investors who are attracted only by the steep discounts
on the secondary market debt might reconsider whether the
purchase-redemption differential more than substantially compen-
sates the investor for the additional risk that the investor under-
takes. Investors also should assess their knowledge of the host
country and the business practices that they may encounter in the
course of the investment."7 Most investment advisors, in fact,
counsel that the investor refrain from investing in any project that
would not have been attractive without the financing discount. 8
E. Summary of Parties' Perspectives
The foregoing analysis suggests that, in the absence of regula-
tory mechanisms reducing the incentives to participate in debt-eq-
uity swaps, all parties benefit from participation. This observation,
however, does not preclude the possibility that swaps may have ad-
verse indirect economic or social effects on the participants which
may limit their use. Moreover, although swaps may be desirable
from the standpoint of a static cost-benefit analysis, they may not
be as attractive as their volume increases.3 " Considering the magni-
tude of Latin America's debt problem, policy-makers and investors
cannot overlook these possibilities. Debt-equity swaps certainly ap-
pear to possess the economic incentives that could make them ex-
tremely popular among investors, banks, and debtor countries, but
a final prognosis on their economic impact cannot be fully made
37. According to two investment consultants, debt-equity swap projects that imply a
diversification in either products or markets, as most do, must pass three essential tests: (1)
the industries chosen must be structurally attractive or capable of being made attractive; (2)
the costs of entry must not capitalize all the future profits; and (3) either the new invest-
ment must gain a competitive advantage from its link with the corporation, or the corpora-
tion must gain a competitive advantage from its link with the new investor. A firm's decision
to use debt-equity swaps should reflect an integrated analysis of both debt-equity swap op-
portunities and the investor's global strategy. The investor's operational and managerial
fundamentals, as well as its capacity to support the investment implicit in a given swap, are
critical to the swap's success. Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13, at 27-28.
Investors interested in engaging in a debt-equity swap must be willing to meet the re-
quirements of the host country. Management must be receptive to the debtor country's
managerial processes unique to debt-equity swap transactions, and to the country's perspec-
tives and priorities in regard to debt-equity swaps, which usually are targeted at specific
projects such as privatization or job creation, and which therefore might focus on economic
sectors unlikely to offer reasonable profits. Id. at 28.
38. Id. This advice to the prospective investor may run contrary to the best interests of
the host country which seeks both debt retirement and new capital investment. See supra
note 16.
39. For a consideration of these effects, see Section V, infra.
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until the vast array of regulations40 and the indirect effects of the
swaps are more fully analyzed.
III. DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES
The prototypical debt-equity swap has inspired a host of vari-
ations which can be categorized broadly under the heading of debt
conversion. 1 In the interest of clarity, these approaches must be
distinguished from one another and evaluated from the standpoint
of their respective abilities to meet the objectives of the host
country.42
A. Debt-Equity Swaps
The debt-equity swap involves the exchange of debt, pur-
chased on the secondary market at a discount, for equity participa-
tion in a host country's industry or for participation in a mutual
fund. 3 The central bank of the host country redeems the debt,
usually at close to face value, and the proceeds of the redemption
are subject to restrictions on the type of investment that may be
made. These restrictions, which primarily are contained in formal
regulations, vary considerably among the Latin American countries
that have programs in place, and will be discussed in greater detail
40. For an analysis of the regulatory environment, see section VI, infra.
41. For a discussion on the use of these terms, see supra note 5.
42. These objectives already have been identified as the retirement of external debt
obligations and the preservation of capital flows. See supra note 16.
These approaches must also be considered as alternatives to the traditional options of
continued repayment, rescheduling, and default. For a discussion of these alternatives, see
supra notes 15-22.
43. One Latin American country, Chile, allows an investor to diversify the rede-
nominated local investment into a pool of equity investments in Chilean corporations. This
investment through a particular country's mutual fund should not be confused with closed-
end mutual funds offered by American investment banks, which package stock-based equity
investments or repackaged high-yield debt paper, aimed at attracting a broader range of
"non-specialist" investors. In closed-end equity funds, investors contribute lesser developed
country debt to a domestic fund manager who negotiates the debt-equity conversion terms,
building up an equity portfolio for the benefit of all subscribers. As with any mutual fund,
investors would receive shares that would trade at the net asset value of the portfolio. See
Next Wave of Variations on Debt-Equity Swaps Offers Creative New Options, 1987 Bus.
LAT. AM. 106. With the debt paper funds such as the Chile offer, however, external debt is
purchased on the secondary market at a discount, packaged together by the fund and the
interest payments flow to the investor. For example, country debt which bears a 10% inter-
est rate and sells at 50% of its face value provides a 20% yield. See, e.g., Roberts &
Remolona, supra note 5, at 24; Wolfson, Wall Street Firms Plan LDC Debt Swap Funds, J.
Com., Dec. 9, 1987, at 12, col. 2.
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in Section IV.
B. Debt-Debt Swaps
A debt-debt swap occurs when creditors holding foreign debt
exchange the debt of one debtor for the debt of another debtor.
The motivation behind the creditors in these swaps is a desire to
adjust the composition of debt within their portfolios, either
through distributing their risk among a wider range of countries or
by narrowing their risks to a few countries, eliminating uncomfort-
able risks in the process."' Tax, accounting, and liquidity consider-
ations also may encourage debt-debt swaps.45 These swaps are fa-
cilitated through either an assignment of loans between creditors
or through the offering of a sub-participation, and may take place
between outside creditors or between an outside creditor and a do-
mestic creditor.46
C. Debt-Home Currency Swaps
The exchange of debt for the home currency of a country,
when it is transacted by a national of the country repatriating
funds, should be distinguished from the conventional debt-equity
swap. Many countries allow these transactions to take place in an
effort to repatriate capital flight, which has been attributed by
many commentators as a leading factor in the difficulty of Latin
American countries to meet their debt obligations.
44. Most banks engaging in these swaps appear to be consolidating their exposures into
the countries which the banks perceive to have long-term strategic interest. Conversely,
banks appear to be ridding themselves of debt when there is little chance of repayment. See
Roberts & Remolona, supra note 5, at 21. This process of debt exchange among banks helps
overcome the resistance of banks in syndicated loan agreements to lend new money to finan-
cially troubled countries in that it removes many of the "free rider" concerns. According to
this free rider theory, no one bank has an interest in lending money to a country where
there is a syndicated loan, and all countries automatically benefit from the actions of the
bank or banks which in turn assume all the risk on the new loan. Thus, there is a certain
resistance on the part of many banks with smaller exposures to lend new money to the
debtor when they realize that the banks with a greater exposure will most likely make the
new loan together if they are forced to do so. Id. at 37.
45. Id. at 22.
46. Id.
47. For a discussion of capital flight, see infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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D. Debt-Goods Swaps
Bearing a strong resemblance to many aspects of countertrade,
the debt-goods swap entails an exchange of goods from the export-
ing/debtor country in return for a simultaneous retirement of a
portion of its debt.'8 As a debt conversion device, debt-goods swaps
have received mixed signals from the banking community. Propo-
nents argue that they create exportation which otherwise would
not have taken place; critics argue that they give investors prefer-
ential access to a country's export earnings.'" Regardless of their
merits, industry analysts estimate that creditor banks might use
this swap to eliminate up to five percent of their outstanding loans
to the participating country.5 0
Peru is the only country to date to have participated in debt-
goods swaps, negotiating three deals with creditor banks. To par-
ticipate in these swaps, Peru requires that they result in a positive
flow of foreign exchange, lead to an increase in net exports, and
involve non-traditional goods, the export of which increases the
value of the local economy.5' In its largest transaction, Chase Man-
hattan Bank would receive $45 million in products, to be marketed
by its wholly-owned trading company, to retire $15 million in
debt.2 The $30 million difference between the sale price and the
debt retired under the plan then would be paid back to Peru in
cash.53
E. Debt-Reform Swaps
For the lack of more appropriate terminology, the term "debt-
reform swap" will be applied to any exchange of debt that is
designed to promote a non-economic objective. For example, under
a debt-for-nature swap arranged between Conservation Interna-
tional and Bolivia, $650,000 of Bolivian debt was retired in return
for a Bolivian commitment to create conservation areas totalling
48. See generally Zuckerman, Midland Debt for Goods, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1987, at
25.
49. See Montagnon, Peru Signs Debt-for-Goods Deal With Midland Bank of UK, Fin.
Times, Sep. 16, 1987, at 6, col. 6.
50. Id.
51. See Zuckerman, supra note 48.
52. See Zuckerman, Chase May Swap Peru Debt for Products, Am. Banker, Dec. 23,
1987, at 3, col. 1.
53. Id.
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more than four million acres.54 Other proposals have attempted to
link debt swaps to employee participation plans, particularly em-
ployee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)."
F. Other Debt Reduction Schemes
An analysis of debt-equity swaps and other debt conversion
schemes must be considered in the light of alternative suggestions
for reducing the burdens of Latin American countries. Although a
thorough discussion of these alternatives falls well beyond the
scope of this article, these alternative suggestions usually assume
three forms."
First, interest capitalization has been suggested in the wake of
many of the creditor banks' increase in their loan loss reserves. 7
Under an interest capitalization scheme, interest rates may be re-
duced or interest payments deferred, with the deferred or reduced
interest added to the level of outstanding principal."
Second, many commentators have called for securing out-
standing Latin American debt.5 9 These proposals take many forms,
but essentially involve the exchange of debt for bonds, debentures,
54. See Agreement Between the Government of Bolivia and Conservation International
(copy provided by Conservation International, signed in Washington, D.C. on July 13, 1987
and on file at the offices of the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review). An edited
version of this agreement is reprinted at 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 515 (1987).
55. See, e.g., CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, HIGH ROAD TO ECONOMIC JUS-
TICE, U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN (1986) (containing Report to the President and the Congress by the Presi-
dential Task Force on Project Economic Justice); McClaughry, Revive a Plan to Put Stock
in Central America, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 28, col. 3; Middendorf, An ESOP's Moral
for the Third World, Fin. Times, Mar. 25, 1987, at 25, col. 6 (concluding "[that] ESOPs
promote greater justice by breaking through restricted ownership patterns" and strengthen
respect for private property and individual responsibility); Employee Stocks: A Third
World Option, Wash. Times, Sep. 26, 1984, at 6C, col. A (interview with Norman Kurland,
one of the founders of the Center for Economic and Social Justice, who concludes that the
concept of economic justice through expanded property ownership will eliminate the Marx-
ism-Leninism mentality).
56. By comparison, Bergsten, Cline, and Williamson have identified 24 alternatives to
bank lending, categorizing them into four types: (1) recent innovations and extension of
existing measures; (2) payments smoothing and interest capitalization; (3) payments linked
to capacity; and (4) debt relief. C. BERGSTEN, W. CLINE & J. WILLIAMSON, BANK LENDING TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES 237 (1985).
57. For a discussion regarding loan loss reserves, see infra note 170.
58. See Cooper, Image, Fiction and Fact About Swaps, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1987, at 20
(Supp.); Outlook, supra note 1, at 137-43.
59. Evans, New Debts for Old - And the Swapper is King, EUROMONEY, Sep. 1987, at
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notes, or other financial instruments. These secured forms of in-
debtedness then could be traded, in either secondary market or
through multilateral institutions."0
Third, a few Latin American countries have engaged in the
direct repurchase of their debt on the secondary market."1 This
method of debt retirement differs from the "debt-home currency
swap" described above in that the debtor country itself, and not a
private citizen of that country, buys the debt on the secondary
market. When translated into a comprehensive debt relief solution,
the repurchase scheme often involves a central agency auctioning
off a country's debt at intervals. When coupled with a commitment
by the debtor country to purchase a specified amount of debt, at
the lowest bid offered by the banks, the mechanism could allow for
a discounted reduction of their debt.
G. Conclusions
The wide range of debt conversion and debt reduction
schemes represents a comprehensive search for solutions to a prob-
60. In March 1988, Mexico retired almost $4 billion of long-term debt in a sophisticated
debt defeasance plan which retired the debt at an average discount of thirty percent. As an
exchange for the retired debt, Mexico issued $2.5 billion thirty-year coupon bonds that were
backed by specially issued U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds Mexico purchased for $442 mil-
lion. The redemption value of these zero-coupon bonds equalled the redemption value of the
thirty-year coupon bonds. DEBT TABLES 1988, supra note 2, at xxii.
For a discussion of Latin American countries' attempts to swap debt for bonds as a
debt reduction technique, see VandenBrandt, Banana Bonds, FIN. WORLD, Aug. 11, 1987, at
14-15; Otwell & Torres, Mexican Plan Sours Debt Market Activity, J. Com., Jan. 26, 1988,
at 15A, col. 2; Rockwell, World Bank Criticized For Debt Crisis Laxity, J. Com., Jan. 6,
1988, at 10A, col. 1; Otwell & Torres, Mexican Debt Plan May Boost Swap Mart, J. Com.,
Jan. 4, 1988, at 7A, col. 2; Orme, Mexican Officials Praise Debt Plan, J. Com., Dec. 30, 1987,
at 7A, col. 5; U.S. to Sell Bonds to Help Mexico Pay Its Debts, J. Com., Dec. 30, 1987, at
7A, col. 2; Commins, Brazil Urged to Convert Foreign Debt Into Bonds, J. Com., Sep. 3,
1987, at 7A, col. 2.
61. Bolivia, for example, repurchased its debt at an 89% discount from its bank credi-
tors, eliminating $308 million in principal payments and over $150 million in interest arrear-
ages and penalties. See Management Alert (Bolivia), 1988 Bus. LAT. AM. 103.
This practice of debt repurchase, however, has recently come under attack by the credi-
tor banks. As a result Bolivia has been prevented from engaging in a second purchase of its
debt on the open market. Paisley, Lenders Reject Debt Buyback from Bolivia, Am. Banker,
Feb. 28, 1989, at 10, col. 4. In the case of Bolivia, many of its creditors feared that allowing a
second buyback would send the wrong message to other debtor countries, that eventual re-
payment, not just reduction, was the ultimate purpose of debt restructuring. Id. Ironically,
these banks' concerns over buybacks have come at a time when some economists have begun
to question the utility of debt buybacks to the debtor country. Bulow & Rogoff, The
Buyback Boundoggle, in BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcONOMIc AcTivrry
675 (1988).
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lem of incredible magnitude. The variety of solutions also reflects
an attempt to tailor solutions to a hemispheric problem to the spe-
cific demands of each debtor country. The debt crisis in Latin
America cannot be addressed as if the country's debt positions are
identical; instead, solutions must be evaluated according to the
specific circumstances of each country's economic outlook and debt
position. Within the parameters of a menu of options, the mainte-
nance of the present strategy of lending and renegotiation also
must be considered an option, as must the option of default. View-
ing this menu of options, however, it is apparent that debt-equity
swaps can play an important role in Latin America's search for so-
lutions to its debt crisis. An analysis of the significance of this role
must proceed from a preliminary assessment of the swaps and
move forward with a slight degree of reluctance, awaiting the em-
pirical data that should ultimately reveal the relative success of the
swaps.2
IV. SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CONVERSION PROGRAMS
An analysis of the specific requirements of the various Latin
American debt-equity programs provides a useful vehicle for a
comprehensive examination of the mechanics of a debt-equity
swap. 3 Comparing the various provisions of each country's pro-
gram also permits a subjective analysis of the effectiveness of the
62. The institution in February 1988 of a formal debt-equity program in Brazil, Latin
America's largest debtor, should reveal a great deal about the ultimate influence that swaps
can play, either alone or as part of a "menu of options." Together with the anticipated
reinstitution of Mexico's program and greater market interest in the swaps, it appears that
there is a strong likelihood that they will soon be playing a much greater role in Latin
America's debt reduction strategy, although an accurate assessment of the swaps' potential
is premature at this time.
63. Although the literature on debt-equity swaps is quite extensive, it is very difficult
for an investor or researcher to obtain copies of the Latin American regulations, either in
the original or translated form. Additionally, it is extremely difficult to separate official from
unofficial versions. Banks often maintain unofficial translated copies for investors, or expla-
nations of the regulations, without having copies of the original legislation or regulations.
The authors of this article have made every attempt to compile and utilize the official ver-
sions of the regulations. In many cases, however, it has been necessary to rely on unofficial
versions and secondary sources. With the exception of the official versions or reprints of the
official versions which we have used, and which will be cited where used, the following sur-
vey articles are helpful in filling the void which researchers will encounter. See, e.g., Profile
of Debt-to-Equity Conversion Programs in Latin America, 1988 Bus. LAT. AM. 44 [hereinaf-
ter Profile]; Capitalisation Programmes: A Survey, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1988, at 38
[hereinafter Survey]; Chase Manhattan Bank, In-house Guide to Debt-Equity Swaps [here-
inafter In-house Guide] (copy on file at the offices of the INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW).
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regime's provisions in ameliorating the host country's debt burden
and in generating new investment. It also may serve as a guide for
other countries interested in formulating a debt-equity program of
their own. As of May 1988, seven Latin Caribbean nations have
active official debt conversion programs, three have suspended
their programs and are contemplating reinstatement, and at least
two countries are on the verge of implementing a program."
For ease of analysis debt-equity programs will be considered
by focusing on four areas: (1) the nature of the debt that is eligible
for conversion; (2) the requirements of the program from the
standpoint of the eligibility of the investor, the project, and the
equity investment; (3) the procedural aspects of the transaction;
and (4) the restrictions on the swap, from restrictions on remit-
tances of profits and capital to restrictions on investment permit-
ted through the swaps.
A. Eligible Debt
There is a wide range of differences among the Latin Ameri-
can debt-equity regimes regarding the nature of the debt that is
eligible for conversion. Some countries limit the eligible debt to
public sector debt, while others allow both public and private sec-
tor debt to be converted. Within each category, further restrictions
apply which characterize more specifically the debt that may be
converted.
Under the Mexican debt-equity program, for example, con-
vertible debt is limited to debt evidenced by Mexican public sector
restructuring agreements."5 This restrictive approach can be con-
trasted with the Chilean regulations, which include both public
and private sector debt, provided that the debt is stated and "pay-
able in foreign currency abroad, with an original or extended term
64. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Uruguay, and Venezuela have active pro-
grams; Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico have suspended their programs; and the Domini-
can Republic and Peru were close to implementing their programs.
65. As of the time of the writing of this article (May 1988), the Mexican debt-equity
program had been suspended, but the financial community was expecting it to be back in
place shortly, under the prior guidelines. As to the nature of the eligible debt, see, e.g.,
NATIONAL COMMISSION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, OPERATING MANUAL FOR CAPITALIZATION OF
LIABILITIES AND SUBSTITUTION OF PUBLIC DEBT BY INVESTMENT 7 [hereinafter OPERATING
MANUAL (MExico)] (section IV - "Substitution of Public Debt by Investment"); Creel,
Mexico, in Survey, supra note 63, at 42 ("According to the Operating Manual (Mexico),
only debt evidenced by the Mexican public sector restructuring agreements is eligible for
conversion into shares of Mexican public or private entities.").
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exceeding 365 days." 6 Argentina's regulations reflect the interme-
diate approach, allowing the conversion of all public sector debt
(brought in as of May 1, 1987) excluding short-term trade credits
and debt owed to official agencies or guaranteed by non-Argentine
official agencies. 7 As with many other regimes, Argentina limits
public sector debt eligible for conversion to that debt whose con-
version would not trigger a prepayment obligation."8
B. Program Requirements
1. Eligible Investors
The differences between the regulatory regimes regarding the
eligibility of the investor appear to result from the host country's
willingness to overlook the actions of foreign nationals who may
have violated exchange controls in their native country and previ-
ously transferred foreign exchange out of their countries. Those
countries that allow nationals to participate in their debt-equity
program thus may be accused of acquiescing in the return of this
capital at an exchange rate that has been artificially inflated by the
program. In addition to failing to punish the original behavior of
the foreign national in "expatriating" the capital, the debt-equity
program also may effectively subsidize the favorable return to the
national. e To the extent that certain countries may not desire to
reward the behavior of the national, these countries often do not
allow nationals to participate in their debt-equity programs.70 Nev-
ertheless, of the ten Latin American countries with debt-equity
regulations, six allow nationals of the country to participate in the
program, perhaps in an attempt to reverse a long tradition of capi-
tal flight.7'
66. Chapter XIX, section 1(a), Rules on Foreign Exchange of Chile, as reprinted and
translated in Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 843 [hereinafter Chilean Regulations]. Sec-
tion 1(b) requires that the "instruments must have been executed, as direct obligor, by the
Treasury, Banco Central de Chile, 'agencies in the public sector',. banking organizations
or financial institutions authorized to operate in Chile..." Id.
67. La Ports Drago, Argentina, in Survey, supra note 63, at 41.
68. Id.
69. See Bucheit, Debt/Equity Conversion Programmes From the Debtor Country's
Perspective, in DEBT-EQuITY SwAPs 48 (published transcript of Euromoney Conference, Jun.
30 - Jul. 1, 1987, London) [hereinafter Euromoney Conference].
70. The following Latin American countries do not permit local investors to participate
in the debt-equity conversion: Chile (for chapter XIX investments), Costa Rica (program
suspended), Jamaica, Mexico (program suspended), and Uruguay. Profile, supra note 63.
71. See Profile, supra note 63, at 41. The five countries are Argentina (chapter III,
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2. Project Eligibility
The wide range of regulations governing eligible projects
under a debt-equity regime reflects the unique nature of each
country's debt composition, political orientation, and evaluation
and assessment of its future economic performance. Some coun-
tries attempt to utilize debt-equity programs to "manage" their
economy, while others are less restrictive, permitting the investor a
wider range of investment options. 72 In many instances, debt-eq-
uity regulations represent government-sponsored attempts to
privatize state-owned enterprises.73
To the extent that a swap into an existing company reflects a
discounted source of funding, the regulations must also be careful
to attract new investment only.74 For those countries having
problems generating sufficient foreign exchange, investment in ex-
porting industries is also highly desirable. 75 The Mexican govern-
ment's regulations, for example, strongly favor investments
section 5), Bolivia, Brazil, Chile (for chapter XVIII investments), Ecuador, and Venezuela.
This list may not be exclusive. The Jamaican regulations, for example, define eligible inves-
tors as "any person (natural or juridical) domiciled and resident abroad." This regulation
does not seem to preclude participation by Jamaican citizens who are domiciled and resi-
dent in foreign countries. See Bank of Jamaica, Programme for the Conversion of Jamaican
External Debt Into Equity Investments, ch. III, sec. 4 (July 28, 1987) (copy on file at the
offices of the Inter-American Law Review) [hereinafter Jamaican Regulations]. For a discus-
sion on capital flight, please refer to the authorities cited infra note 164.
72. Officials will often set investment priorities by type of venture and geographic area.
The highest priorities, and therefore the highest redemption prices, are for buyers of state
enterprises being privatized and for new investments of capital expenditures that generate
exports, reduce imports, create jobs, or are located in special zones. See Hannon & Haugen,
Latin America Debt Conversion Proliferates, Bus. AM., Jun. 22, 1987, at 2, 6. See generally
Profile, supra note 63, at 45. See further La Porta Drago, supra note 67 (investments that
produce an increase in efficiency, productivity or the supply of goods or services, with spe-
cial focus on those which increase Argentina's balance of payments, are eligible); Central
Bank of Brazil, Resolution No. 1.460, chapters VIII, X (Feb. 1, 1988) (translated copy pro-
vided by Antonio Angotti, Vice President, Security Pacific Merchant Bank, New York)
(converted proceeds must be invested in new projects or in the expansion of existing
projects) [hereinafter Brazilian Regulations] chapter VIII, X; Ianes, Chile, in Survey,
supra note 63 (chapter XIX does not specify types of eligible investments, although the
Chilean authorities prefer projects that generate exports and employment); Jamaican Regu-
lations, supra note 71, at chapter IV, section 5(i); OPERATING MANUAL (MExIco), supra note
65, at 29 ("Table of Conditions and Discounts For Use of the Mechanism of Substitution of
Public Debt By Investment").
73. The Mexican regulations, for example, redeem debt at face value, where the pro-
ceeds are intended to purchase a government company. See OPERATING MANUAL (MExICO),
supra note 65, at 29.
74. For a discussion of additionality, see supra note 36.
75. See supra note 72 (listing regulation sections of foreign government programs that
grant priority to investments that, inter alia, increase exports).
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designed to increase exports, generate investment in new fixed as-
sets or new products, and bring new technology into Mexico. 6
3. Eligible Equity Investment
The host country closely regulates the type of stock issued to
the foreign investor through a debt-equity swap. In Mexico, the
regulations are precise as to the type of stock that may be issued
and the methods by which it subsequently may be transferred."
Accordingly, the Mexican corporation receiving the investment
must issue "qualified capital stock" 8 to the investor. This stock
must be in registered form and may not be transferred to a Mexi-
can individual or entity before 1998.71 The issuing Mexican com-
pany must amend its bylaws to allow for this stock, which may not
be convertible into anything other than additional qualified capital
stock.80 In an effort to prevent the swaps from depleting valuable
foreign exchange, the holder of this qualified capital stock may not
redeem the shares more quickly than the principal payments are
made on the underlying debt for which it was exchanged."
C. Procedural Aspects
The degree of procedural complexity surrounding the various
debt-equity regimes would seem to affect greatly the demand for
conversions under the specific program. From the investor's stand-
point, in addition to the high net payout, 2 lower processing costs83
76. See Creel, supra note 65.
77. See generally section 5.11 of the Agreement on the Restructure of the Foreign Pub-
lic Debt, included in OPERATING MANUAL (MExico), supra note 65, at 24.
78. Id. at provision (b).
79. Id.
80. Under section 5.11, such stock must be subject to certain restrictions regarding its
transferability, redemption, and conversion into other instruments. Creel, supra note 65.
81. In-house Guide, supra note 63, at 3.
82. This phrase refers to the stage of a debt-equity swap where the host country re-
deems the redenominated debt "at close to face value." Naturally, the investor desires con-
version at face value, which will be approached in most cases if the local proceeds are in-
vested in projects of high priority to the host country. See supra note 72.
83. See LaPorta Drago, supra note 67, at 41-42 (In Argentina, an investor must provide
a one percent performance guarantee in the form of bank bond or deposit, which will be
refunded once the debt is accepted by the bank through the public bidding process); In-
house Guide, supra note 63, at 8 (Chile has no fees in chapter XIX, but the bid price neces-
sary to gain access to transactions must be paid to the government in chapter XVIII trans-
actions); Jamaican Regulations, supra note 71, at 13 (assessing a Jamaican $250.00 process-
ing fee on a swap application).
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encourage investment and reduce delays8' in the completion of the
application process, allowing the investor to respond more quickly
to changing economic conditions. The host country, however, must
address a different set of concerns before it approves a project. A
more careful and lengthy application process is sometimes required
to identify the most worthwhile investments and maintain the nec-
essary control over the country's economy.85 Especially when con-
sidering the potential for inflationary pressures that swaps may
place on the domestic money supply,86 many countries must coun-
terbalance investor concerns for expediency with their own con-
cerns for productive investment within the parameters of a desired
monetary target.
Most countries review proposed investments on a case-by-case
basis,8 7 granting or denying applications based on their specific
needs at the time. Others prefer a more market-oriented approach
allowing the rationing process to occur through an auction.8 Some
of these auctions occur only after an initial review has been made
by the appropriate government body, while others serve as the sole
determinant of who may participate in the program.
The Chilean guidelines serve as a useful model to compare the
ration system with the auction system. 9 Under Chile's Chapter
84. For the average time of approvals (after completion of the application) of debt capi-
talizations from the host country's central bank, see Brazilian Regulations, supra note 72, at
chapter IX, article 20 (60 days); Illanes, supra note 72 (1-3 months); Jamaican Regulations,
supra note 71, at 13 (45 calendar days); In-house Guide, supra note 63, at 2 (Approvals
from Mexican Ministry of Finance and Foreign Investment Commission granted in 8
weeks).
85. See infra note 100 which discusses particular countries' application procedures.
86. For a discussion of inflationary effects of debt-equity conversion programs, see infra
notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Creel, supra note 65 (Mexico analyzes direct foreign investment in accor-
dance with applicable provisions of the Foreign Investment Law and its own regulations,
accepting or rejecting investments using the same general criteria as when reviewing other
cases of foreign investment); Rules for the Conversion of Foreign Debt Into Investment, in
Venezuela, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 259, 278 (1987) [hereinafter Venezuelan Regula-
tions] chapter V, article 18, at 282 (external public debt converted into internal debt under
financial conditions equal or better for the debtor entity, as determined in each case by the
Central Bank and Ministry of Finance). Chile (for chapter XIX investments), Jamaica,
Mexico, and Venezuela evaluate debt-equity conversion projects on a case-by-case basis. See
Profile, supra note 63, at 45.
88. For the Latin American countries using the auction system, see La Porta Drago,
supra note 67, at 42 (offers are processed through a public bidding process held every other
month); Brazilian Regulations, supra note 72, at chapter II. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (for
chapter XVIII investments) primarily use the auction system. See Profile, supra note 63, at
45.
89. See Annex 2: Illustration of Transactions Under Chile's Debt Conversion Scheme,
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XIX guidelines, applicable to banks, multinational corporations,
and individuals, the Central Bank rations the projects through a
case-by-case review.90 Under the Chapter XVIII guidelines, appli-
cable to Chilean nationals and non-residents,91 the auction mecha-
nism determines the investment.92 Since the Chilean debt-equity
conversion scheme is generally acknowledged as the pioneer in
swaps,93 a more detailed explanation of the Chilean conversion
procedure is also helpful as a model for other countries considering
the introduction of a debt-equity program.
The Chilean program primarily consists of Chapters XVIII
and XIX of the Compendium of Rules on International Exchange,
and Decree Law 600, the Foreign Investment Law.9' As outlined in
Chapter XIX, the foreign investor must first find a foreign debt
instrument eligible for conversion and reach an agreement with the
original debtor in order to convert the debt instrument into an ob-
ligation denominated in pesos.9 5 The foreign investor must use ex-
ternal funds to complete the transaction. 6 Further, the agreement
between the investor and debtor must include an express waiver to
any right of access to the foreign currency market for payment of
the debt.97 Chapter XVIII provides for the purchase of Chile's ex-
in Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 834-38.
90. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 826.
91. "Chapter XIX is specifically for foreigners who must seek Central Bank approval
for a specific investment and are guaranteed access to foreign exchange." Hannon & Hau-
gen, supra note 72, at 4.
92. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 826-27.
93. The Chilean debt-equity swap design began in mid-1985 and is considered the most
successful to date, converting the largest amount of debt. Id. As one authority has noted,
"[miajor factors explaining Chile's success are the clear-cut rules, lack of foreign investment
restrictions, and the country's favorable investment climate." Hannon & Haugen, supra
note 72, at 4.
94. Under chapter XVIII, the peso proceeds need not be used for investment purposes,
there is no right of access to foreign exchange for eventual repatriation of principal or earn-
ings, and no approval from the Central Bank is required; under chapter XIX, conversions
are used exclusively for investment purposes, and there are capital and dividend repatria-
tion restrictions. Decree law 600 enables a creditor holding foreign currency-denominated
paper of a Chilean debtor to convert it into an equity holding in the host country and per-
mits remittances of capital and dividends abroad. See Chilean Report, supra note 34, at
826-33; Annex 1: Legal Framework for Debt Conversion in Chile, id. at 831-33; for a further
comparative analysis of these instruments.
95. Id. at 832.
96. The primary purpose of requiring investors to fund a portion of a proposed invest-
ment with freely convertible foreign currency (or its equivalent in tangible assets or technol-
ogy) is to prevent the local currency generated through a debt-equity swap transaction from
funding an overseas expenditure by a recipient entity/company. Id.
97. Id. at 832.
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ternal debt by nationals. The peso proceeds need not be used for
investment.9 8
The foreign investor then receives approval from the host
country's central bank to invest the local currency proceeds de-
rived from the debt conversion in particular activities.9 9 The for-
mal application to the central bank must include the names of all
parties included in the investment and shall provide the necessary
information regarding the proposed investment.' The investor
must agree to accept various restrictions on the type of investment
and on the repatriation of profits and capital, as well as other mis-
cellaneous requirements.00
After having received central bank authorization, the foreign
investor purchases the eligible debt instrument from the foreign
creditor, and delivers it to a Chilean bank. 03 At this point, the
Chilean bank must then either collect the face value of the rede-
nominated note in cash or exchange it for a new debt instrument
which may be payable in local currency.'03 In some cases, the debt
instrument may also be payable in local currency at terms negoti-
ated with the debtor, as opposed to indexed units of exchange.'
In the event that the central bank is the debtor on the instrument,
the terms of the repayment are governed by regulation; for other
debtors, the prevailing market conditions govern.'015
98. Id. at 826.
99. Id.
100. For other specific country application requirements, see La Port Drago, supra
note 67 (investment proposal, including a disbursement schedule and other documents,
must be submitted); In-house Guide, supra note 63, at 20 (Brazil is currently studying a
number of specialized applications); Illanes, supra note 72, at 40 (documents require details
of the investor, investment project, debt to be converted and the redenomination and pre-
payment terms); Jamaican Regulations, supra note 71, at chapter VI, section 9 (written
agreement with the Jamaican government) and Exhibit A therein; Creel, supra note 65
(Mexico requires an outline of proposed investment and background of investor, question-
naire providing projected U.S. dollar inflow amounts, and capitalization agreement).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 114-37.
102. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 835.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The rate of exchange that applies to the debt-equity conversion varies among
the participating countries. See Profile, supra note 63 (Argentina converts at the financial
rate); Guimaraes, Brazil, in Survey, supra note 63, at 41 (registration of investments in the
public sector will be made at the face value of the converted debt, less a discount which will
be fixed by the Central Bank); Profile, supra note 63, at 44 (Jamaica converts at the official
rate); In-house Guide, supra note 63, at 3 (Mexico exchanges at the average of the free rate
of exchange for purchase and sale quoted by at least three domestic banks at closing, peso
proceeds are deposited with the Central Bank and disbursed per invoices, the excess pro-
ceeds earn interest at T-Bill rates); Profile, supra note 63, at 44-45 (Venezuela exchanges at
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If the Chilean bank has exchanged the debt instrument for a
new debt instrument payable in local currency, this new debt in-
strument may then be sold in the Chilean secondary market (usu-
ally with the aid of a Chilean broker) for cash. Because of the nor-
mally low interest rate of the note, however, this new debt
instrument is generally sold at a discount from its face value.'06
Upon sale, the Chilean bank disburses the proceeds of the sale di-
rectly for the acquisition of shares of equity in Chilean corpora-
tions or through other forms of investment that have previously
been authorized.10 7 The Chilean broker or bank which handles the
transaction, like the foreign broker earlier in the transaction, re-
ceives a commission which is usually about one percent of face
value.10 8
Under both the Chapter XVIII and Chapter XIX procedures,
the Chilean investor locates the eligible foreign debt and obtains a
redenomination agreement with the Chilean debtor.'0 9 After this
point, Chapter XVIII procedures are different from Chapter XIX.
The Chilean bank, on behalf of the investor, submits a closed bid
to the Central Bank which declares the total foreign currency face
value to be paid by the investor to acquire the foreign debt instru-
ment and the additional price (the commission as a percent of the
acquisition cost) that the Chilean investor is willing to pay for the
authorization to convert the debt to local currency.1
After having received all of the sealed bids, the central bank
selects the highest bid and continues to select downward until the
predetermined auction amount is fully utilized. The bank notifies
the official rate, reviewable every six months).
A necessary precondition for exploiting the advantages of a debt-equity swap is that the
"transactions must take place at a free market rate, or the official rate must be close to the
free rate, in order that the discounts available on the debt are not outweighed by the ex-
change rate considerations." Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 823. Additionally, "[tihe in-
centives provided by converting discounted external debt into a domestic obligation with a
higher market value can be offset if such conversions involve the use of an official exchange
rate that does not reflect the free market rate." Id. at 829.
Note that critics of Venezuela's swap program have been quick to point out the disin-
centives built into the program which force conversions to take place at an official exchange
rate that is almost twice the free market rate. Hannon & Haugen, supra note 72, at 5.
106. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 835.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 835, 836. For a discussion on the benefits to brokers who handle debt-equity
swap transactions, see also infra notes 166-67.
109. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 837.
110. Id.
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the appropriate Chilean banks of their selections.111 At this point,
the central bank debits the account of the Chilean bank for the
commission and value-added tax on the commission.
The Chilean investor must purchase the foreign debt obliga-
tion and deliver it to the Chilean bank. The Chilean bank rede-
nominates the debt in local currency at a rate equal to the face
value of the debt at the official exchange rate, and creates a new
local currency debt instrument to replace the redenominated in-
strument.'12 The Chilean debtor is the direct obligor and the debt
is payable to bearer, denominated in local currency, at the agreed
upon terms and conditions. This new instrument is sold in the fi-
nancial market at a discount and the proceeds of the sale are deliv-
ered to the Chilean bank for disbursement to the investor. 1 3
D. Restrictions
Considering that the desire to limit the outflow of foreign cur-
rency reserves is one of the economic motivations behind the debt-
equity swap, it seems that any debt-equity regime would attempt
to ensure that the demands on currency reserves caused by the eq-
uity investments do not exceed those placed by payments on the
debt."" Chile's determination of a ten year capital repatriation re-
striction, for example, approximately reflects the average life of
"new money" loans. 15 Since these demands, in the equity context,
can take the form of rights to repatriate capital and pay dividends
in a foreign currency, it is not surprising that a well-crafted pro-
gram would attempt to place limits on capital and profit remit-
tances. 1a These limits are common to all Latin American regimes,
but vary considerably in their details.
111. Id. Note that these rights may be transferred to the other banks.
112. Id. at 838.
113. Id.
114. Were it otherwise, countries might see an immediate outflow of capital or profit
remittances by the private investor, thus paying both principal and interest immediately
rather than just debt service. Hannon & Haugen, supra note 72, at 3.
115. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 833.
116. Profit and dividend remittances may eventually exceed debt service, creating
greater capital outflows. Hannon & Haugen, supra note 72, at 3. These restrictions are nec-
essary because, as many Latin American debt experts have noted, one of the main problems
with the Latin American economy is that the income from countries' assets abroad is not
being repatriated. For example, it has been estimated that if the interest on Mexico's esti-
mated US$20 billion in American bank accounts had been brought home in 1983, it would
have paid for an estimated 10% of the country's debt-servicing bill. See Latin America: The
Other Side of Debt, ECONOMIST, Jun. 23, 1984, at 73, 74.
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Restrictions on capital repatriation range from five years, in
Bolivia and Venezuela,"' to twelve years,' in Ecuador, Brazil,
and Mexico."19 Some exceptions apply, however, to these restric-
tions. Jamaica allows capital to be repatriated after three years for
"priority" projects, 2 ' while Uruguay provides that capital cannot
be repatriated at terms more favorable than terms of the original
debt."'
Restrictions on profit remittances also vary considerably.
Some countries have no restrictions on profit remittances; 2 others
allow profits to be repatriated as soon as they are realized; 2 ' and
many limit repatriation to a period from three to five years.2 4
Under Chile's Chapter XIX guidelines, investors may not remit
profits for four years, but no restriction exists on new profits after
the fifth year.' 25 For accumulated profits derived from the first
four years, profits may be repatriated as of the fifth year, but only
at a rate not to exceed 25% of the first four years' profits. 2 6 This
restriction represents a trade-off because, as the conversion
reduces or eliminates the exposure of the relevant creditor to
Chile, the liability of such creditor to new exposure through "invol-
117. Venezuelan Regulations, supra note 87, at 281 (chapter 3, article 13 prohibits re-
patriation during the first five years of the investment, then permits 12.5% per year for
years 6-13).
118. Brazilian Regulations, supra note 72, at chapter VI; Guimaraes, supra note 105
(the converted proceeds may not be used to acquire foreign investments during this capital
repatriation period, unless the proceeds of the acquisition are reinvested in Brazil; further-
more, the foreign investor must deposit an amount equal to the return of capital, limited to
the investment, during this period). See also Profile, supra note 63, at 45.
119. For other country specifics of when capital may be repatriated, see La Porta
Drago, supra note 67 (ten years); Chilean Regulations, supra note 66, at 7 (chapter XIX,
section 6(a) specifies ten years, but 12 years if capital invested in a mutual fund); Illanes,
supra note 72 (investor not granted access to foreign exchange under chapter XVIII); Jama-
ican Regulations, supra note 71, at chapter V, section 6A (3-7 years depending on the
investment).
120. Jamaican Regulations, supra note 71, at chapter V, section 6B. The restriction
period is seven years for other qualified investments as specified in chapter V, section 6A.
121. Herrera, Uruguay, in Survey, supra note 63, at 39.
122. Bolivia is one such example. See Profile, supra note 63, at 44.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 846 (chapter XIX, section 6(b)). Net profits may
not be remitted for five years if the investment was made in a mutual fund. Illanes, supra
note 72.
126. Id. Chilean Regulations, supra note 66, at chapter XIX, section 6(b). Note that
these repatriation restrictions are not applicable under chapter XVIII because, as the swap
conversion is strictly peso denominated, the investor is not granted access
to foreign exchange. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 826, 831.
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untary new money" calls is reduced or eliminated.127 Mexico limits
remittances within the first five years to an amount less than the
amount of interest on the original debt, while Venezuela allows ten
percent remittance during the first three years, followed by a rate
of twenty percent plus the rate of LIBOR.1"
Some countries, however, permit the investor to sell his equity
interest in the foreign country and transfer the share certificates or
other documents evidencing the ownership interest to another in-
vestor. 12  The variations on these restrictions also reveal a great
deal of diversity.
Foreign investment that is generated by debt-equity swaps is
also subject to other restrictions generally placed on direct foreign
investment. Many Latin American countries restrict foreign invest-
ment to certain sectors of the economy or place limits on the per-
centage of equity ownership that a foreign investor may hold in a
host country's company."' The foreign investor, or the national as
a foreign investor, must carefully consider the local taxes that com-
plement the debt-equity regulations.
127. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 833.
128. See, e.g., Venezuelan Regulations, supra note 87, at chapter III, article 6 (no more
than 10% per year for the first three years, then remitted pursuant to Decree No. 1,200);
Hannon & Haugen, supra note 72, at 5. For a discussion of the provisions of Decree No.
1,200, see Venezuelan Regulations, supra note 87, at 274. LIBOR is the London Interbank
Official Rate.
129. La Porta Drago, supra note 67, at 41 (after three years, a foreign investor may sell
its investment and convert the proceeds into foreign currency, provided the proceeds are
deposited with a public sector bank until the ten-year capital repatriation period has
elapsed); Guimaraes, supra note 105, at 41 (eligible debt may be converted into equity by
the original creditor or its assignees); Jamaican Regulations, supra note 71, at chapter V,
section 7 (subject to the approval of the Bank of Jamaica, an investor may sell an interest in
a Qualified Investment before the end of the repatriation period provided that: (i) the Pur-
chaser is an "eligible investor"; (ii) consideration for the transaction is foreign currency ob-
tained other than through the Auction Market for Foreign Exchange; and (iii) the Purchaser
submits to the Debt Capitalization Unit a certificate confirming that the Purchaser under-
stands that the capital and dividend restrictions continue and agrees to assume all obliga-
tions of the original investor regarding the original investor's investment); Venezuelan Regu-
lations, supra note 87, at 280 (chapter 3, article 7 provides that capital proceeds from
liquidation may only be used for investment in another enterprise or to acquire Develop-
ment Portfolio Securities. The date of first investment realized shall be taken as the base).
130. See, e.g., La Ports Drago, supra note 67 (the purchase of equity participation and
personal property or financial investments is not eligible, and investments in real estate or
in working capital required for the project are limited to 10% of the project value); Brazilian
Regulations, supra note 72, at chapter XXVI; In-house Guide, supra note 63, at 4 (Mexico
reserves the following economic activities for the state. They are therefore not subject to
foreign investment: petroleum, petrochemicals, radioactive and nuclear energy, mining, elec-
tricity, railways, and telegraphic and radiotelegraphic communications).
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The prospective investor must be fully aware of the traditional
Latin American predisposition against direct foreign investment in
their economies. Investors in Argentina's debt-equity program, for
example, are subject to the provisions of the country's Foreign In-
vestment Law, which states that investments in certain sectors re-
quire prior approval.181 The Investment Law also places a special
tax on net profits and capital gains in excess of the 12% registered
investment. 132 In addition, Argentina taxes corporate income at a
rate of 33%, and dividends, except stock dividends, that are paid
to foreign residents are subject to a withholding tax of 17.5%. 133
Mexico's recent income tax reform imposes a 20% tax on the price
differential between debt purchased and the redemption price.'34
Direct foreign investment in Mexico is subject to the country's
Foreign Investment Law, which clearly restricts the degree of for-
eign ownership in specific areas of the economy. 13 5 Some indus-
tries, such as oil and petrochemicals, are reserved exclusively for
state ownership, while other areas require either complete Mexican
ownership, a majority Mexican participation, or, in most cases, a
limit of 49% foreign participation.' As an exception to these
rules, the National Commission on Foreign Investment has the au-
thority to authorize up to 100% foreign ownership in a Mexican
corporation or allow direct foreign investment under specific guide-
lines in furtherance of the country's National Development Plan.'3 7
V. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS
Proponents and critics of debt-equity swaps have set forth
131. La Ports Drago, supra note 67, at 42 (e.g., public services, telecommunications,
defense, oil and gas, financial entities, steel, petrochemicals, mining, as well as investments
which result in de-nationalization of local entities and investments in excess of $5 million).
132. The excess over 12% in one year can be offset against deficiencies below that per-
centage in the previous five years. See id. Mexico also taxes companies located in Mexico.
Stock companies are taxed at a maximum rate of 42%, with the possibility of making de-
ductions from revenue. Dividends paid to foreign residents are taxed at a flat 55%. Creel,
supra note 65.
133. La Porta Drago, supra note 67. See also Guimaraes, supra note 105 (supplemental
income tax of 40% to 60% on the distribution of profits applies when the average distrib-
uted profits, after deducting the 25% withholding tax, for three consecutive years exceeds
12% of registered foreign capital).
134. Profile, supra note 63, at 45.
135. See Creel, supra note 65, at 45.
136. Id. See also Profile, supra note 63, at 45 (debt-equity investments in Argentina
limited to 70% of the project costs, the balance requiring financing in dollars or australs).
137. Creel, supra note 65.
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many arguments concerning the advantages and disadvantages of
the swaps to the major participants.1 38 Most of these arguments,
however, are contingent upon the structure of the country's con-
version program as well as the country's overall view towards the
investment.13 9 Nevertheless, some general propositions can be
made regarding the effects of a swap or swap regime on the partici-
pants as the swap is implemented.
A. Advantages
In analyzing the benefits of debt-equity swaps, attention
should be directed to the four major participants: (1) the foreign
bank creditors which hold debt; (2) the investor desiring to
purchase the debt through a debt-equity swap; (3) the debtor
country, whose debt is sold to investors; and (4) the broker, who
facilitates the debt-equity swaps. Advocates of debt-equity swaps
argue that all participants benefit because the bank creditor un-
loads troubled loans, the investor secures inexpensive financing in
local currency, and the debtor country reduces external debt while
attracting foreign investment and promoting growth. Upon further
examination, however, these benefits are not so clear.
1. Foreign Bank Creditor
The bank creditor initially evaluates the possibility of unload-
ing problem loans from its portfolio, which in turn supplies the
debt used in the debt-equity conversion programs." " This evalua-
tion entails a consideration of the loan, the debtor country, the im-
pact of unloading the loan on the bank's bargaining power with the
debtor country and other debtors, and the evolution of discounts
138. The popular literature discussing the desirability of debt-equity swaps is enor-
mous. For some useful comments on the relative advantages and disadvantages, see Curtis,
Here Comes The Repo Man, THE NATION, May 2, 1987, at 570-74; Evans, supra note 59;
French, Swapping Debt - Just Hot Air?, EUROMONEY, May 1987, at 115-22; Kuttner, Third
World Debt: A Flawed Solution, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 18; Marton, The Debate Over
Debt-For-Equity Swaps, INST'L INVESTOR, Feb. 1987, at 177; Ollard, The Debt Swappers,
EUROMONEY, Aug. 1986, at 67-75; Riemer, A Way To Turn Debt From a Burden to a Boom,
Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 1986, at 25-26; Schubert, Trading Debt for Equity, THE BANKER, Feb.
1987, at 18; Hayes, Debt/Equity Swaps, Miami Today, Apr. 30, 1987, at 13, col. A.
139. Hannon & Haugen, supra note 72, at 3.
140. Thus a major factor determining the evolution of the debt conversion market will
be the attitude of the U.S. major money center banks, who hold the bulk of Latin American
debts, and whether they will be willing to supply the market by selling part of their holdings
at a discount. See Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 824-25.
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in related debt-equity swap markets. 141 If the bank decides to sell
the loan, it defines a negotiation discount range that will satisfy its
own financial requirements.14
Although the original lender is the least beneficial participant
because it absorbs extensive losses by selling its debt from finan-
cially troubled debtors at huge discounts, it is nonetheless relieved
to eliminate undesirable loans from its books for part of their cash
value." 3 If losses are recognized through sale at a discount, the
loan is then removed from the bank's books, which reduces the
bank's exposure to that country by the full value of the loan
sold.' 4 By removing some of the bank's sovereign exposure from
its books, its short-term liquidity increases, allowing it to focus
lending strategy toward healthier and more promising opportuni-
ties. 4 5 Additionally, cleaning up the composition of the bank's loan
portfolio by removing some of these problem loans decreases its
exposure to default/currency risks, thereby increasing its earnings
per share.146 Finally, selling these debts through debt conversion
programs relieves the bank from continuing to make "involuntary
loans" to debtors of financially troubled countries as part of "res-
141. Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13, at 22.
142. Id. See also infra note 168.
143. It is important to distinguish the bank as a supplier of debt on the secondary
market from the bank as an active participant/investor in the swap itself. If the bank de-
cides to participate directly in the debt-equity swap, as opposed to selling off its debt to the
ultimate purchaser or serving as the broker of the transaction, the loss it suffers is equal to
the discounted rate at which the central bank of the debtor country will redeem the debt.
See Hayes, supra note 138.
144. Evans, supra note 59, at 82. If, however, the losses are recognized through the
forced write-down on loans held by the banks, their exposure declines only by the size of the
write-down. Id.
145. Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13, at 24.
146. Some banks maintain a fiction that their uncollectible loans will be fully paid off
to prevent increasing loan loss reserves. However, the stock markets generally see through
this accounting veil and write down the value of those banks with heavy exposure in the
problem debtor countries. Sachs & Huizin ga, supra note 1, at 576-77. On May 20, 1987,
John Reed, Chairman of Citicorp, announced an increase in the bank's loan loss reserves by
150%, to $5 billion, incurring an immediate $1 billion loss. At the time of the decision, Mr.
Reed said the increased reserves gave Citicorp the increased flexibility to break the debt
deadlock by allowing the creditor banks to swap debt for equity, or to trade the debt on the
secondary markets. Citicorp's stock price rose $3 (six percent) the morning after, evidencing
Wall Street's vote of confidence. Citicorp Comes Clean on Third-World Debt, THE ECONO-
miST, May 23, 1987, at 77. One interpretation of the resultant increase in stock prices could
be that banks were being rewarded for increasing their reserves and ensuring the long-term
viability of future earnings, even at the expense of reduced long-term earnings. Conway &
Siegenthaler, supra note 23, at 5. However, earnings should not be overlooked at the ex-
pense of protecting a bank's solvency from loan losses. Id. at 90. See infra note 170 (discuss-
ing recent additions to loan loss reserves and the U.S. regulatory response).
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cue" packages.1 47
2. Investor
Debt-equity swaps provide an excellent opportunity for a for-
eign investor, and now local investors under many conversion pro-
grams, either to make an investment in a Latin American country
or to secure additional equity in its investment portfolio in the in-
debted country by securing low-cost financing in local currency.14
8
For example, by purchasing a one million dollar domestic loan at
60% of face value and then converting the proceeds into local cur-
rency at close to face value to be invested into a subsidiary in that
country, the investor has received a substantially greater amount
of local currency for the amount invested than it would have ob-
tained through normal investment procedures. This discount in-
centive is equivalent to a preferential exchange rate.'14  The aver-
age discount of Latin American debt varies tremendously from
country to country.'8
Engaging in debt-equity swaps also gives the investor access to
protected foreign markets that might not otherwise be available to
him. It may also provide a basis for more harmonious relations
with host governments, and an improved ability either to circum-
vent existing barriers to entry in global markets or to erect new
147. Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13, at 24. For a discussion of the involuntary loan
phenomenon, see supra note 12.
148. Ganitsky & Lema have explained that:
The net value at which a corporation exchanges currencies through debt-equity
swaps is obtained by subtracting the broker's discounts and the administrative
or governmental fees from the proceeds paid in the secondary market adjusted
by the redemption exchange rate. The yield is computed by dividing the net
value by the nominal value and subtracting one. The net value, the discounts,
and the yield are immediate valuations in international financial markets of the
LDC's long-term political and economic risks, its immediate ability to service its
debt, and its capacity to generate a favorable investment climate. If the coun-
try's long-term outlook is gloomy, the short-term discount tends to be high, and
vice versa.
Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13, at 23.
149. See Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 830.
150. Although the discounted prices primarily reflect the prospects for loan repayment,
many other factors have a possible influence, one being the degree of disagreement that
exists among banks or among debtors and creditors over specific rescheduling programs.
Roberts & Remolona, supra note 5, at 20. Other factors affecting the market price for this
debt in the secondary market include the capacity of the country to generate exports, the
investment outlook, political stability, and natural disasters. Hayes, supra note 138.
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ones.
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3. Debtor Country
The benefits to the debtor country are numerous. Most notice-
ably, the debtor country generates new investment which fosters
growth,' 52 improves its balance of payments, thereby reducing the
strain on export earnings, improves its economic climate and its
utilization of resources and opportunities, cancels some of its for-
eign debt, and reduces interest payments on existing loans.
Debt-equity swaps improve a country's balance of payments.
As its foreign debt is reduced, its interest payments on the debt
correspondingly decrease.'513 However, these benefits are poten-
tially offset by the increased profit or dividend repatriation which
flows from the new foreign owner's capital stock.'
The purpose of a conversion from debt to equity parallels link-
ing debt-servicing payments to exports.5 Both free up some for-
eign exchange, net of the loss of new lending, permitting increased
imports and larger domestic output.'" a The conversion delays the
amount of foreign exchange moving out of the country for debt
servicing. Additionally, the conversion directly reduces the govern-
ment's debt-servicing obligations as the country replaces its loan
repayment obligations with the less certain and deferred outflows
151. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 825.
152. Financial flows to developing countries tend to be unstable, reversing to outflows
during times of economic crisis. See BERGSTEN, CLINE & WILLIAMSON, supra note 56. In con-
trast, direct investment is more permanent, and its rate of earnings outflow actually moder-
ates during cyclical recessions. In one respect, then, this conversion would have unfavorable
systemic effects. If forced on banks against their will, this measure would leave scar tissue
that would adversely affect the country's future credit rating, thereby impeding the coun-
try's return to more normal access to capital markets. In another respect, however, conver-
sion of debt to equity would have favorable systemic effects, because it would help redress
the current imbalance between the two. All else being equal, this will result in a greater
inflow of foreign investment into the country than would occur in the absence of such a
program. Id.
153. See, e.g., Fierman, John Reed's Bold Stroke, FORTUNE, June 22, 1987, at 26;
French, supra note 138, at 120. Swapping public debt for equity in private businesses
reduces the respective foreign governments' interest bill and brings in a significant amount
of foreign exchange, as would new loans. For a discussion of debt versus equity finance, see
supra note 9.
154. See Dornbusch, Impact on Debtor Countries of World Economic Conditions, in
EXTERNAL DEBT, SAVINGS, AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA 60, 81 (A. Martirena-Mantel ed.
1987).
155. See BERGSTEN, CLINE & WILLIAMSON, supra note 56.
156. Id.
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associated with foreign direct investment. 57 The debtor country
could thus reduce the amount of interest it would have to pay out
that year by the equivalent of the interest on the debt sold in the
secondary market. 15 8
Debt-equity programs can give the debtor countries access to
badly needed investment in export-oriented industries. 159 Only
through increasing exports and earning dollars can the debtor
countries ever hope to stay one step ahead of the creditors. The
swaps also benefit the country's economic development through
new investment in equity or real property acquisition, the expan-
sion of plant capacity, or additional export sales in markets where
it is currently noncompetitive. Instead of borrowing to provide for
growth, the debtor country can bring in foreign direct invest-
ment "1 0 and have the same rate of growth.1 61 If the new investment
occurs in export items, the investment can lead to increases in the
amount of foreign exchange that is available.1 6 2 Finally, the new
investment can lead to increases in employment, and decreases in
the cyclical fluctuations of the country's economy by diversifying
the economic base, especially if these new investments are required
to take place in areas where investment is not typical."'
Debt-equity swaps can also be tailored to reverse the flow or
flight of capital from debtor countries, which has been commonly
attributed to such factors as overvaluation of the exchange rate,
financial repression translating into negative real interest rates, fis-
cal deficits, tax evasion, risk factors, and external incentives pro-
vided by foreign banks and governments. 6 Accordingly, a well-
157. Chilean Report, supra note 34, at 828.
158. Hayes, supra note 138, at 13, col. B. It is argued, however, that these benefits will
not be achieved for a country with a budget problem because a net reduction in interest will
depend on the discount rate of the external debt and the amount by which interest rates
exceed the rate on external debt plus exchange depreciation. If the government does not
appropriate most of the discount at which the external debt now trades, it is likely that the
required debt service would increase. See Dornbusch, supra note 154, at 80-81.
159. Marton, supra note 138.
160. See generally LESSARD & WILLIAMSON, supra note 12, at 46-48 (appraisal of eco-
nomic benefits associated with direct foreign investment).
161. Hayes, supra note 138, at 14, col. F.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. For a comprehensive examination of the problem of capital flight for developing
countries, see generally D. LESSARD & J. WILLIAMSON, CAPITAL FLIGHT AND THIRD WORLD
DEBT (1987) [hereinafter CAPITAL FLIGHT I]; D. LESSARD & J. WILLIAMSON, CAPITAL FLIGHT.
THE PROBLEM AND POLICY RESPONSES (1987) [hereinafter CAPITAL FLIGHT II]. In particular,
see Rodriguez, Consequences of Capital Flight for Latin American Debtor Countries, in
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designed debt-equity program could help reduce capital flight by
allowing foreign nationals to repatriate money held in foreign
banks without corresponding penalties. Along these lines, Chile's
"Chapter 18 guidelines" should serve as a model for other Latin
American countries.6"
4. Broker
The broker links the various participants in the transaction,
and, through competitive bidding, helps disseminate financial and
market information. Debt-equity swap brokerage services have
been provided by traditional financial brokers and investment
bankers,' 6 who charge a commission usually ranging from one to
two percent of face value. 11 7 Participation in debt-equity swaps
also benefits brokers by allowing them to expand their financial
services and develop broader skills to facilitate the transactions.
B. Disadvantages
1. Foreign Bank Creditor
The most immediate disadvantage to the bank creditor is that
it incurs heavy cash and accounting losses because of the sale of its
debt at heavy discounts. 68 However, a more important concern re-
garding loss recognition is whether accounting principles will re-
quire the bank creditor to write down the remaining portfolio to
market after selling problem loans at a discount. Current U.S. ac-
counting standards do not require such a write down. Nevertheless,
critics argue that the responsibility to record assets at net realiza-
CAPITAL FLIGHT I, at 129.
165. See Arellano & Ramos, Case Studies, Chile in CAPITAL FLIGHT I, supra note 164,
at 166.
166. Note that because of the popularity and high brokerage fees earned by facilitating
debt-equity swaps, it has been observed that "[e]veryone and his dog has set up in business
as a debt-for-equity swap arranger." Mark, Debt-Business Boom in Latin America,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 81.
167. Also note that the role and the fees commanded by brokers decline as public offi-
cials, banks, and corporations learn the ins and outs of debt-equity swaps. Ganitsky &
Lema, supra note 13, at 22.
168. The loss is important because it reduces the bank's book capital, which is impor-
tant for regulatory purposes, and is charged against taxes. See supra note 29. Bank creditors
selling troubled debts should also be alert to the tax benefits (savings) when determining its
sales price. See Sachs & Huizinga, supra note 1, at 591; supra notes 140-42 and accompany-
ing text.
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ble value through the provision of loan loss reserves forces manage-
ment to increase the reserves at the expense of either making alter-
nate investments or paying dividends to shareholders. 169 However,
banks would be in a better financial position in the future if they
would increase their loan loss reserves and report the losses cur-
rently. 17 0 Finally, creditor banks might not want to establish an
169. This is a weak argument, however, because major banks holding debt from finan-
cially troubled nations have begun reporting record losses by increasing their loan loss
reserves, regardless of whether or not they have sold that debt to investors engaged in debt-
equity swaps or whether required by U.S. accounting regulators. For a discussion of recent
record additions to loan loss reserves, see infra note 170, and, for further discussion of these
accounting regulations see infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
170. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), a bank's loan portfolio
should be carried at amortized historical cost less loan write-offs and the allowance for loan
losses, as long as the bank has the ability and intent to hold the loans until their maturity.
Allowances are established and write-offs taken based on management's judgment regarding
ultimate collectability of the loans in the normal course of business. The amount of loan
losses, over time, is important for stockholders and other users of financial statements as
such data provide insights into the overall quality of a bank's credit portfolio and its ability
to control credit risk.
After Citicorp added a staggering $3 billion to its reserves against losses on loans to
developing countries, raising the reserves to $3.5 billion and representing 26% of its ques-
tionable loans, a $2.5 billion quarterly loss resulted - the biggest bank loss in memory -
although Citicorp's stock price increased the following day. A few weeks later, Norwest
Corp. of Minneapolis, the United States' 24th largest bank, raised its reserves against Third
World loans by $200 million, suffering a $160-million quarterly loss. The next day, Chase
Manhattan, the United States third largest bank, increased its reserves by $1.6 billion.
Fierman, supra note 153. On December 14, 1987, the Bank of Boston became the first major
American bank to acknowledge that a significant portion of its Latin American loans was
worthless by writing off $200 million of its $1 billion portfolio. Berg, Bank of Boston In Big
Write-Off Of Latin Loans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). The write-offs
do not directly affect the earnings reported to shareholders because they are charged against
loan loss reserves, but may affect taxable income. See supra note 29. This move could lead
to pressure for similar steps by other global banking companies. The other major money
center banks now find themselves in a no-win situation. If they do not build up their own
reserves, their stock price may erode further; if they increase their reserves from the average
25% for Latin American debt towards an estimated necessary 50%, their already thin share-
holders' equity could be reduced further, and they could invite even greater ills, such as
higher financing costs. Banks cannot set aside equally large reserves and expect to recover
this lost capital through share offerings because of the November 1987 stock market crash.
Berg, Banks' Reserves and Latin Loans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at D10, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
Some analysts see the higher level of reserves at the regional banks as a form of muscle-
flexing to show their investors the banks can sustain big hits in stockholders' equity, but the
banks defend the move as realistic and necessary in dealing in the international arena. Ben-
nett, Major Banks Are Divided On Reserves, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1988, at D1, col. 6 (nat'l
ed.). Because of these mixed reasons, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) entered the scene to
offer its quiet guidance that other banks need not correspondingly follow suit, but should
make their own decisions. One New York FRB spokesman said "we continue to stress the
importance of banks' strengthening their capital and reserve positions over time, taking into
account the condition of the organization as a whole." Bennett, Fed Urged Caution On
Reserves, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1988, at Dl, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
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undesirable precedent for other loans to the same or other
countries."'
Because interest paid in the form of equity would not necessa-
rily be treated on a non-accrual basis, this option might have a
somewhat less adverse impact on banks' balance sheets and income
statements than those, for example, linking payments to exports.
172
Banks would need to have assurances about the future treatment
of profit remittances to be able to convert debt to local equity
without a potential loss of value.'" Moreover, some banks would
consider this option to imply that a private sector borrower was
unable to service its debt even in local currency. 7 " Considering
that payment in local currency would always make the purchase of
the equity in question a possibility, whereas the reverse would not
necessarily be true, banks might prefer payment in local currency;
payment in equity might be a less favorable alternative forced by
the financial weakness of the borrower.L75
Another concern is that smaller Latin American countries may
never generate enough foreign exchange to allow the banks to con-
vert their holdings back into dollars.176 This concern would effec-
tively destroy the benefits of debt-equity swaps and deter creditors
from considering them as a debt reduction mechanism.
Frequently restrictions exist on the pace at which dividends
can be remitted.1 77 As investors, however, the banks might try to
protect their investments through such measures as making divi-
dends mandatorily payable once the venture has made sufficient
profits, establishing and controlling a sinking fund from which to
pay dividends, or protecting against possible devaluation of the lo-
cal currency by indexing the dividends and redemption payments
to reflect any inflationary or exchange rate changes. 78 Dividend re-
mittances might also be arbitrarily frozen by a foreign debtor na-
tion some time in the future, although exchange inconvertibility
risk insurance could be obtained to offset against such risks.1 79
171. Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13, at 24.
172. See BERGSTEN, CLINE & WILLIAMSON, supra note 56, at 173.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Evans, supra note 59, at 97.
177. For a discussion on restrictions of foreign remittances, see supra notes 122-28 and
accompanying text.
178. Evans, supra note 59, at 97.
179. For a discussion on the availability of risk insurance to participants in debt-equity
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Finally, if too many banks suffer massive write-offs, interest
rates would rise as loans became scarce resulting in a possible
recession. 1 0
2. Investor
One disadvantage to the foreign investor is that increased
participation in foreign investment activities increases exposure to
foreign, political, and economic risks. As commentators have
stated, "Investors expose themselves to the transfer risk related to
the remittance of capital dividends, particularly foreign exchange
inconvertibility, and to political risks normally associated with an
investment for ten years or more in a developing country.""1 ' As
one analyst has noted:
Debt-equity swap risks and the environmental threats magnify
the vulnerability of the firm. Nationalist sentiments, rampant
inflation partially fueled by other swaps, currency swings, and
uncertainty about how the host government will manage its
economy in the future are a few of the risks to be evaluated by
decision makers before any swap is approved."8 '
Additionally, in the absence of an existing subsidiary in the
foreign country to invest the local currency, the investor would
have to adjust its policies and administrative systems and adapt its
organization to the country's legal, political, cultural, and ethical
frameworks. l s
3. Debtor Country
Because the host government will have to finance the repur-
chase of its debt from the foreign investor, economists fear that a
poorly structured debt-equity swap program could increase the
monetary aggregates in the debtor country and, if not properly
managed, lead to inflation." 4 This inflationary pressure would oc-
transactions, see infra notes 270-86 and accompanying text.
180. Satterfield, Latin American Debt Pile Weighs Heavily on U.S. Banks, J. Com.,
Aug. 20, 1987, at 7A, col. 4.
181. Hannon & Haugen, supra note 72, at 3. But see infra text and accompanying notes
272-79 for a discussion on the availability of risk insurance which can be purchased by re-
luctant investors to reduce these risks.
182. Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13.
183. Id. at 24.
184. Economists more specifically seem to be saying that debt-equity swaps are not
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cur when a debtor country's central bank redeems the external
debt in the conversion, causing it to print local currency to pay off
the creditor bank. This redemption would pump more money into
the domestic economy, which would tend to be inflationary unless
the local government neutralizes its monetary impact. 8 5 However,
this fear could be curbed by issuing debt instruments to limit the
amount of debt converted.186 A further dilemma, regardless of the
possible neutralizing effects, is that the net effect of a debt-equity
swap is an increased internal debt and a reduced foreign debt.8 7
Accordingly, the country swaps bad debt for good capital and the
government swaps low interest (i.e., external debt) for expensive
domestic debt."88
A host government cannot simply swap a debt obligation for
an investment. The debt servicing costs rise considerably when the
central bank repurchases the debt in local currency from a foreign
investor since local borrowing typically involves high interest rates
in most severely indebted nations. 8 A country's domestic interest
rates may also increase as competition arises between swaps and
government borrowing of domestic currency.190 Finally, because
capable of extinguishing large portions of a country's external debt without generating infla-
tion. The national money supply must increase as local currency is exchanged for debt in-
struments unless proper sterilization measures, i.e., the sale of additional government bonds
to soak up local currency from the public, are instituted. Therefore, bearing in mind the size
of the external debt as compared to the domestic money supply, any large scale redemption
will inevitably cause difficulty in sterilization. See MOBILIZING, supra note 36, at 45.
185. This "neutralization" of the increase in the domestic money supply is technically
referred to as "sterilization." Debtor countries would most likely sterilize the increase
through the sale of domestic bonds to the public, the object being to prevent the creation of
local currency needed to redeem the external debt. This sterilization procedure, however, is
not without its problems. First, the domestic credit markets of the developing countries are
most likely to be incapable of sustaining additional demands from governments which for
the most part have already absorbed the majority of available credit. Second, sterilization
may be undesirable in that it may substitute an external debt at a lower interest rate with a
domestic debt that may carry a higher rate of interest. See MOBILIZING, supra note 36, at 45-
46; Evans, supra note 59, at 94. Some believe that the last thing an illiquid country should
do is pay off its debts, particularly if this involves creating inflationary pressures in the
economy. Some would argue even if the money were available to cancel the debt, the funds
would be better spent on other things such as roads, pensions, and health care. Marton,
supra note 138. The creditor banks, however, believe that if the new local currency is di-
rected toward productive investment and new productive capacity, it is difficult to visualize
an inflationary impact on a present value basis. Evans, supra note 59, at 94.
186. MOBILIZING, supra note 36, at 46; Hayes, supra note 138, at 13, col. E.
187. Dornbusch, supra note 154, at 80.
188. Id.
189. Curtis, supra note 138, at 573. See also Dornbusch, supra note 154, at 81.
190. "While the switch from foreign to domestic government debt is desirable from the
standpoint of external transfer risk, it can be costly in real terms given the fact that real
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regulators want banks to maintain their own capital as a certain
percentage of their overall assets,""' banks suffering massive write-
offs may cause interest rates to rise as loans become scarce and
thus promote a possible recession. 92
Debt-equity swaps raise additional concerns in that debtor
countries might be providing subsidies to foreign investors who
would make such investments anyway. 93 Companies that already
have facilities in the debtor countries are the major users of swaps,
employing them as an inexpensive way to expand their opera-
tions.1 4 Thus, if the foreign investor would have made the invest-
ment without the discount, the host country would have received a
direct infusion of foreign exchange in payment for such invest-
ment. If the discount occurs, the country will be placed in a more
unfavorable foreign exchange position than before since the con-
verted proceeds came into the country at the discounted amount
and not at 100 percent.'95 Also, the nation's debt is merely can-
celled, as opposed to it having been rescheduled over the next ten
to twenty years and, conceivably, not repaid even then. Therefore,
countries may not see additional foreign investment as a result of
the debt swap. Currently these countries may be providing an un-
necessary incentive to foreign investors and using up valuable for-
eign exchange hurting their balance of payments position.'96
The concept of "round-tripping" also concerns most countries
contemplating a debt-equity program. Round-tripping occurs when
an investor brings money into the debtor country and converts it
to local currency, takes it back out on the black market or parallel
market, exchanges it again for dollars, and takes it out with no net
benefit to the foreign country.9 7
Conversion of debt to equity may also cause a host of political
interest rates in some of the major debtor countries have been extremely high." MOBILIZING,
supra note 36, at 46-47.
191. See supra note 29.
192. Satterfield, supra note 180.
193. Professor Dornbusch argues that most swaps are "rip-offs" for this reason; in his
view, when involved with a swap, the central bank, in providing the local currency, is sad-
dled with an unnecessary subsidy. Marton, supra note 138.
194. Id.
195. MOBILIZING, supra note 36. For a discussion on "additionality," see supra note 36.
196. Hannon & Haugen, supra note 72, at 3. Although it could be argued that the gov-
ernment could direct the converted proceeds into new, additional investment, and not into
existing assets which do not have as much benefit to the country, critics doubt this
probability. Dornbusch, supra note 154, at 81-82.
197. Roberts & Remolona, supra note 5, at 35-36.
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problems. The debtor countries might object to the removal of
their debt from the hands of the highly visible commercial banks
to anonymous investors, raising serious issues about the control of
national resources.' As has been noted, "[Dieveloping-country
opponents, particularly those on the political left, argue further
that swaps allow foreigners to exchange nonperforming debt for
control of viable domestic assets and at a discount."' 99 In the state
sector, there would be the question of whether the government
would be willing to convert sovereign debt into foreign holdings of
state enterprises. 00 In the private sector, a foreign bank that has
lent money over the years to a private firm might acquire an equity
interest in that firm without causing political reaction in the
debtor country; however, a direct acquisition of equity in the pri-
vate sector through a debt-equity swap could raise political
problems on a large scale.20 1
Debt-equity programs also run the risk of misallocating valua-
ble resources. First, as noted, to the extent that the redemption of
the discounted debt effectively creates a preferential exchange
rate, investments arising under the program may be unwisely en-
couraged. Second, the use of foreign funds to retire the country's
external debt denies other uses of these funds. The more the pro-
gram directs swap proceeds to a specific use, the greater the degree
of preference that is exhibited for that particular use.202
The potential moral hazard20 3 created by the advent of debt-
198. Evans, supra note 59, at 85. Political scientists also fear that swaps could lead to
heightened domestic violence because of increased foreign ownership of industry. However,
this fear could be curbed somewhat by allowing local employee ownership through Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) in privatized state-owned enterprises. For a further
discussion of ESOPs in Latin America, see supra note 55.
Moreover, the "investment" is often purely financial; a U.S. investor buys out a local
investor, but no new assets are created. Kuttner, supra note 138. This results in net capital
inflows remaining constant while foreign companies gain an increasing stake in local opera-
tions. Curtis, supra note 138, at 573. For a definition of "additionality," see supra note 36.
199. Marton, supra note 138. See also MOBIIZING, supra note 36, at 48; Dornbusch,
supra note 154.
200. BERGSTEN, CLINE & WILLIAMSON, supra note 56, at 172. If it decided to convert
sovereign debt into foreign holdings of state enterprises, the debtor country would lose con-
siderable control of state-owned companies. Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13, at 24.
201. BERGSTEN, CLINE & WILLIAMSON, supra note 56, at 172. With respect to the nar-
rower issue of conversion of debt to equity, from a political-economic standpoint this mea-
sure could be counterproductive if pursued on a large scale. In some countries the result
could be a whole new sphere for conflict between nationalism and the interests of foreign
capital. Id. at 175.
202. Roberts & Remolona, supra note 5, at 33-34.
203. "Moral Hazard" has been defined as:
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equity regimes also raises questions about the programs' desirabil-
ity. To the extent that declining conditions within the debtor
country result in declining prices of that country's debt in the sec-
ondary market, it is possible countries might deliberately enact un-
wise measures or take unpopular positions regarding repayment so
that they may take advantage of the reduction. This moral hazard
concern is more likely to appear where the debtor country is itself
repurchasing its debt on the secondary market. The risk is less
likely to occur in the debt-equity or debt-home currency swaps.2""
Finally, it has been argued that debt-equity swaps might re-
sult in a future decrease in commercial bank loans. Specifically,
debt-equity and debt-home currency swaps might serve to reduce
the supply of deposits that are currently held in money center
banks, as capital flight currency is repatriated and U.S. investors
participate in the debt-equity programs. This would diminish the
supply of funds in the banks that could be used for future loans.20 5
4. Broker
The main disadvantage for brokers seeking to enter the busi-
ness of facilitating debt-equity swaps is that they risk credibility if
they fail to solve conflicts of interest among the participants, the
country, the bank, and the investor, which would create adverse
precedential effects for established companies not benefitting from
new debt-equity swaps.20 6 Furthermore, there is the possibility
that brokers might strain managerial resources if they underesti-
mate the demands of the swap.20 7 However, on balance, these are
not significant disadvantages because of the high commissions paid
The effect of certain types of insurance systems in causing a divergence between
the private marginal cost of some action and the marginal social cost of that
action thus resulting in an allocation of resources which is not optimal. For ex-
ample, a person may be insured against illness in such a manner that the cost to
him of consuming more medical care is less than the cost to society. Conse-
quently, he may increase his use of medical facilities beyond the socially optimal
level ....
THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMicS 257 (3d ed. 1986).
204. Roberts & Remolona, supra note 5, at 32.
205. Id. at 27-28. These authors, however, note that debt-debt swaps might actually
increase future lending in that they would transfer debt exposure to banks more willing to
assume risk of a particular country repaying its loans and, hence, more willing to renegotiate
old loans. Debt-equity swaps would also provide an exit mechanism for pessimistic creditors
possibly generating more flexibility of the loan rescheduling. Id. at 28.
206. Ganitsky & Lema, supra note 13, at 24.
207. Id.
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for arranging the swap transactions.
VI. THE U.S. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
From the perspective of the U.S. policy-maker, the promotion
of debt-equity swaps requires that attention be directed at four
regulatory areas: (1) bank regulation; (2) accounting regulation; (3)
tax regulation; and (4) the availability of risk insurance. Financial
institutions which seek to invest directly in Latin American enter-
prises are governed by banking regulations which limit both the
size and type of their investment. Similarly, accounting and tax
regulations may facilitate or retard the willingness of banks and
private investors to trade in Latin American debt on the secondary
market. Finally, the availability of risk insurance, either through
public or private channels, may generate greater demand for the
debt-equity swaps by eliminating investment risks which may oth-
erwise discourage investors who are unfamiliar with the political
and economic climate in Latin America.
A. Bank Regulations
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) regulations, and specifically
Regulation K, 08 closely control the investment activities of na-
tional banks in foreign countries. Regulation K limits such invest-
ments by U.S. member banks and bank holding companies to in-
vestments "of a banking or financial nature and those that are
necessary to carry on such activities."2 9
Until recently, these regulations resembled domestic restric-
tions on investment, and limited direct investment to traditional
banking areas. Banks which were interested in swapping debt for
equity in a Latin American country were thus limited in their in-
208. Federal Reserve System Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1987).
It must be noted, however, that Regulation K is not the exclusive mechanism for al-
lowing banks to assume equity positions in non-financial ventures. The traditional principle
of "debt previously contracted" derived from both 12 U.S.C. § 29 and 12 U.S.C. § 24, also
may allow for such transactions. See generally Lucio, Debt-equity Swaps and U.S. Banks:
Alternatives to Regulation K, in THE FLORIDA BAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN
LATIN AMERICA. CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO INTER-AMERICAN LEGAL PROBLEMS 5.1 (1989) (lec-
ture outlines of presentations delivered at continuing legal education seminar held in
Miami, Florida, Feb. 2-3, 1989) (copy on file at the offices of the University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review).
209. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(a) (1987).
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vestment opportunities.21 Although recent relaxation of these reg-
ulatory standards has set the stage for expanded activity by large
money-center banks, preliminary enthusiasm for flexible regula-
tions governing investment through debt-equity swaps should be
tempered by a closer examination of the amended regulations.
Regulation K originally limited the ability of national banks to
engage in debt-equity swaps by both delineating the range of activ-
ities in which banks could invest and restricting the percentage of
equity that the bank could hold in a foreign company.211 With
some minor exceptions, national banks could hold up to 20% of
the shares of a nonfinancial company and up to 100% of the shares
of a financial company.212 Regulators carried over the financial/
nonfinancial distinction from the domestic bank holding company
regulations, and generally allowed investments which would have
been permissible under an analysis of Regulation Y.213
Recognizing that greater liberalization of Regulation K would
be required to promote debt-equity swaps in heavily indebted
countries, the FRB amended Regulation K in August 1987.214 The
Board's amended regulation made it easier for banks to participate
in debt-equity swaps by allowing U.S. banking organizations to ac-
quire as much as 100% of the shares of, or other ownership inter-
est in,215 a foreign nonfinancial company in an eligible country216 if
210. For example, until it was recently amended, Regulation K made it difficult for
banks to invest in nonfinancial activities such as "hotels in Mexico or fish farms in Chile."
Evans, supra note 59, at 89.
211. Before Regulation K was amended in 1987, the FRB's position was that the regu-
lation would be applied to an equity investment acquired through a debt-equity conversion
in the same fashion as any other investment. See Quale, Legal and Accounting Considera-
tions Relating to Debt Equity Conversions, in Euromoney Conference, supra note 69, at 58.
212. The financial sector in most Latin American countries is severely under-capitalized
and desperately needs foreign investment. The awareness of this need is causing some gov-
ernments to open such sectors to greater foreign investment in spite of the politically sensi-
tive nature of the sector. Id.
213. Federal Reserve System Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1987).
214. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f) (1988) [hereinafter 1987 Regulations]. The FRB's com-
mentary stressed that the policy of the amended regulation was to provide to U.S. banking
organizations flexibility in managing their portfolios of loans to heavily indebted countries,
and not to permit permanent investments in nonfinancial companies. Id. For a useful sum-
mary of the 1987 revisions, see Spencer, Regulation K Allows 100 Per Cent Ownership,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1987, at 13.
215. This provision would allow bank holding companies to own an interest in a busi-
ness entity which under the respective foreign law does not issue shares.
216. An "eligible country" is defined as "a country that, since 1980, has restructured
debt held by foreign creditors." 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(2)(i) (1987). Although neither the
amended Regulation K nor the commentary identifies which countries meet this condition,
the FRB commentary refers in a footnote to Section 1201(e)(2)(H) of the Tax Reform Act of
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the following conditions are met:
1) the nonfinancial company is in the process of being trans-
ferred from public to private ownership;" 7
2) the country in which the company is located is a heavily
indebted developing country;
3) the shares are acquired through a debt-equity swap;"'
4) the shares are held by the bank holding company or its sub-
sidiaries, 19 provided, however, that such shares are not held by a
U.S. insured bank or its subsidiaries;22 0
5) the ownership interest is divested within five years from the
date of acquisition,221 unless the FRB extends the time for good
cause but in no event longer than a total of ten years; and
6) an investment is made in accordance with the investment
1986, which lists the following: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Do-
minican Republic; Ecuador; Guyana; Honduras; Ivory Coast; Jamaica; Liberia; Madagascar;
Malawi; Mexico; Morocco; Mozambique; Niger; Nigeria; Panama; Peru; Philippines;
Romania; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Sudan; Togo; Uruguay; Venezuela; Yugoslavia; Zaire; and
Zambia.
217. The FRB commentary to the revisions makes it clear that the foreign government
must have owned the shares in the foreign nonfinancial company; it would not be sufficient
for the foreign government, solely for purposes of the debt-for-equity conversion process, to
acquire the shares in the foreign nonfinancial company and then transfer those shares to the
bank holding company. The commentary also states that "private investment in such com-
panies [that are currently state-owned] may provide some benefit to the countries by reduc-
ing economic inefficiencies and governmental subsidies." 1987 Regulations, supra note 214.
218. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(1)(ii) (1988) states that "the shares are acquired by conversion
of sovereign debt obligations of the eligible country either through a direct exchange of debt
obligations or a payment for the debt in local currency, the proceeds of which are used to
purchase the shares." The debt-equity conversion procedures in the eligible country would
have to be reviewed to ensure that they comply with this requirement. The FRB will con-
sider investments in countries requiring that new money be invested in addition to the pro-
ceeds of the debt obligation being swapped on a case-by-case basis. 1987 Regulations, supra
note 214.
219. The purpose of this is to "erect an effective barrier between the bank and the
commercial and industrial activities of the companies to be acquired." Thus, ownership
through the bank holding company will further isolate the nonbanking activity from the
banks and will indicate that the nonfinancial company is not protected by the federal safety
net available to banks. Further, the restrictions of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act
(12 USC § 371c) will apply as a matter of law to transactions between the bank and affili-
ated companies such as the foreign nonfinancial company. See 1987 Regulations, supra note
214.
220. The transfer of an asset from a bank to its holding company or to another subsidi-
ary of the holding company, and the conversion of the asset from debt to equity, could
result in the recognition of loss for U.S. tax and regulatory reporting purposes. Furthermore,
such a debt-for-equity conversion would raise portfolio valuation issues. Id.
221. This is consistent with the dividend and capital repatriation restrictions present in
many debt conversion programs. Id.
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procedures as set forth in the appropriate section of the Code of
Federal Regulations.222
In order to address the potential problems of possible conflicts
of interest, unsound banking practices, and the financial markets
viewing the U.S. banking organization and the nonfinancial affili-
ate as one entity, the amended regulation specified that two addi-
tional conditions be met. First, the acquired foreign company can
not have a name similar to the name of the acquiring bank holding
company or any of its affiliates. 223 Second, neither the bank hold-
ing company nor its affiliates can transmit any confidential busi-
ness information or other information regarding customers that
were engaged in similar businesses as the acquired company.
2 24
Furthermore, the commentary stipulated that U.S. banking organi-
zations maintain few interlocks of officers and directors between
the banking organizations and the nonbank affiliate. In the event
such interlocks are required, they would be allowed only to the ex-
tent that they are "administratively necessary. ' 2 1 "As an addi-
tional precaution, the foreign company could not as a general rule
engage directly or indirectly in trade or business in the United
States which is prohibited to Edge Act corporations.
221
The reaction to the August 1987 FRB ruling was mixed. Some
members of the banking community cautiously approved of the
ruling's liberalization of the regulations, while others expressed
doubts that the ruling would have much of an impact on the swap
market.227 There were also suggestions that bankers could easily
222. From a procedural standpoint, the amended Regulation K provides that any debt-
equity swap under § 211.5(f) will be treated like any other investment under Regulation K
and will be subject to the standard approval requirements of that Regulation. 1987 Regula-
tions, supra note 214.
223. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(3) (1988). The commentary states:
The restrictions on the sharing of a similar name by the U.S. banking organiza-
tion and its nonbank affiliate would reduce the likelihood that a bank would be
identified with the nonbank company and thereby reduce the pressures on a
banking organization to support the affiliate in the case of losses.
Id.
224. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(3)(ii) (1988).
225. 1987 Regulations, supra note 214.
226. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(1)(v) (1988) and 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(b)(3)(A), (B) (1988).
227. Compare the comments of Neil Allen, head of the LDC asset trading division of
Bankers Trust in New York ("Of course we welcome the move. But this is only one step;
further liberalisation is needed.") with those of Antonio Angotti of Security Pacific Bank
("The Fed's decision doesn't change much. Most countries, when they privatise, want cash,
not debt. It's useless interference."). Evans, supra note 59, at 89. For additional commen-
tary on the FRB's decision, see Commins, Fed Ruling May Sour Some Debt Swaps, J. Com.,
Aug. 20, 1987, at 7A, col. 2; Wolfson, Fed Ruling on Swaps Fails to Stir Debt Mart, J. Com.,
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avoid the regulations by acquiring preferred, non-voting stock or
obtaining equity interests in exchange for debt previously
contracted.228
Although the August 1987 amendment to Regulation K was
issued as a final rule and was thus effective upon issuance, the
FRB did request comments from concerned parties as part of a
continuous examination of the rules governing debt-equity swaps.
The FRB received twenty-three public comments and made the
decision to further amend Regulation K to take into account these
public suggestions. On February 18, 1988, the FRB announced its
most recent amendment of Regulation K's rules on debt-equity
swaps, taking effect on February 24, 1988.29
Six major revisions were made to Regulation K in early 1988.
First, the amendment allows a U.S. banking organization to invest
in up to forty percent of the shares of a private sector nonfinancial
company through the use of a debt-equity swap. 30 In contrast, the
1987 amendment only concerned itself with investments in public
sector companies that were being privatized by the government of
the foreign country.23 1 Other provisions of Regulation K, however,
limited investment in the nonfinancial sector to 20% of the shares
of the company, so that the recent 1988 regulations reflect a signif-
icant liberalization of the rules. 32
Aug. 18, 1987, at 2A, col. 1; Truell & Yang, Fed Agrees to Let U.S. Banks Acquire Nonfi-
nancial Firms in Debtor Nations, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1987, at 3, col. 2.
228. See Evans, supra note 59, at 89, 91.
229. See 53 Fed. Reg. 5358 (1988) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)) [hereinafter 1988
Regulations].
230. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(2)(ii) (1988) states in part: "Private sector companies. A bank
holding company may acquire up to and including 40 percent of the shares, including voting
shares, of (or other ownership interests in) any other foreign company located in an eligible
country subject to the following conditions. .. "
For the conditions imposed on this ownership interest, see infra notes 233-36 and ac-
companying text.
231. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(2)(i) (1988).
232. Although the August 1987 and February 1988 Regulations frequently refer to the
20% ownership in non-financial companies previously allowed under Regulation K, there is
little reference to how this figure was determined, thus generating a great deal of confusion
among many bankers before the 1988 Regulations specifically raised the ownership limit in §
211.5(f)(2)(ii). Under § 211.5(c), however, an investor (defined as an "[e]dge corporation,
agreement corporation, bank holding corporation, or member bank" in § 211.2(j)) could
make "portfolio investments" in a corporation subject to certain restrictions. The term
"portfolio investment" is defined in § 211.2(n) as "an investment in an organization other
than a subsidiary or joint venture." Since a "joint venture" is defined in § 211.2(k) as "an
organization that has 20 percent or more of its voting shares held directly or indirectly by
the investor or by an affiliate of the investor," and since a "subsidiary" is defined by §
211.2(p) as "an organization that has 50 percent or more of its voting shares held directly or
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Second, the new regulation requires that another shareholder,
or a control group of shareholders, own a larger block of shares
than the U.S. banking organization if it acquires more than 25% of
the voting shares of a nonfinancial company.2 33 According to the
FRB, this requirement demonstrates that there is another equity
holder with substantial capital at risk and ensures that the bank
holding company would not have to shoulder sole operational re-
sponsibility for the company. Not only would the investor not be
put in a position where additional investments would have to be
made to prop up a failing enterprise, but it would also become far
less likely that the host country would place responsibility for the
failure of the nonfinancial company on the U.S. organization.284
Third, any U.S. banking organization which makes an invest-
ment in a company under the revised Regulation K guidelines is
also permitted to provide loans or other financing in an amount up
to 50% of the total loans and extensions of credit to the affiliated
company. 35 Since at least one-half of the company's credit must
be obtained through the marketplace, the FRB intends to ensure
that the company is creditworthy and will not be allowed to rely
on its U.S. affiliates for all of its funding. As such, the provision is
similar in nature to the limitation on share ownership.236
Fourth, the new regulations extend the period for which the
U.S. bank may hold the debt-equity investments in nonbank com-
panies. Under the 1987 revisions, the investment could be held for
five years with the possibility of a five-year extension.2 7 The new
regulations allow investments made under the new guidelines to be
held for the lesser of 15 years or two years beyond the end of the
period established by the country restricting repatriation of the in-
vestment. It applies to both privatized and private sector
companies.2 8
Fifth, unless the FRB permits a bank to hold it, the invest-
indirectly by the investor or by an affiliate of the investor," the conclusion was that the term
"portfolio investment" limited investment in nonfinancial organizations to 20 percent. For a
rather indirect treatment of this analysis, see Mortimer & Slade, Foreign Securities Activi-
ties of U.S. Banks, INT'L FIN. L. REv., June 1987, at 17.
233. 1988 Regulations, supra note 229 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(2)(ii)(A))
(1988)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at § 211.5(f)(2)(ii)(B).
236. Id. at § 211.5(f)(2)(ii)(A).
237. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(1)(iv) (1988).
238. Id. at § 211.5(f)(4).
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ment is required to be held through a bank holding company and
not its bank or subsidiary." 9 The FRB, however, will consider
these exemptions on a case-by-case basis and will require that the
applicant show a special need to hold the nonfinancial investment
through the bank. One such need, for example, would be a local
legal requirement that would require that the investment be held
by the bank.24
Finally, the new regulations increase the general consent limit
of Regulation K to the greater of $15 million or one percent of the
investor's equity capital." 1 This limit represents the fact that an
organization may invest without giving prior notice to the FRB,
and would also apply to investments made in public sector
companies.2 42
The most recent amendments to Regulation K are a substan-
tial liberalization of the rules governing investments made by
banks through debt-equity conversions. However, they fail to reach
as far as some banks would have liked. Private debt, for example,
is still not eligible for conversion under the FRB's regulations.
Many banks would prefer to have the nonfinancial investments
held by the bank and not the holding company. In addition, many
commentators also feel that the 40% share allowance is still too
low. Nevertheless, the new regulations reflect a sensitivity on the
part of the FRB to the requirements of the participants in debt-
equity transactions, which suggest that future needs will also be
considered as they arise.
B. Accounting Regulations
Until recently, accounting regulations, which discouraged
banks from selling foreign debt through debt conversion programs,
have played an important part in limiting the supply of debt that
is traded on the secondary market. When a bank creditor sells a
portion of its foreign debt at a significant discount, it recognizes
that the carrying value of the debt exceeds its sales price. A ques-
tion is raised whether the remaining portfolio of that obligor
should be written down to market value,2"" to more accurately re-
239. Id. For a definition of "a bank holding company" see 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(2)(ii).
240. Id. at § 211.5(f)(3).
241. Id. at § 211.5(f)(5).
242. Id.
243. Note that European, Japanese, and Canadian banks are required by law to write
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flect its actual value.2 4 Former U.S. accounting standards followed
this logic. 245 This long-running debate also applies to banks selling
debt in debt-equity swaps. For large money center banks holding
sizeable amounts of debt in one country, an "all or nothing"
mentality would be created. Unless the bank could simultaneously
release all of its debt on to the secondary market, the bank would
refrain from selling any part of the debt in order to prevent report-
ing significant book losses, even if the bank subsequently increases
stockholders' equity.246 These concerns destroy all incentives to ex-
tend further credit to Latin America and other financially troubled
countries.241
It is critical to the expanded use of debt-equity conversions
that no write-down be required. 24 ' The promotion of debt-equity
swaps could best be achieved by accounting regulations limiting
the write-down of the bank's foreign loan portfolio only to debt
sold at a discount. The collectability of loans should not be related
to the write-down resulting from swaps. The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is currently considering new
guidelines reflecting this logic. With banks following Citicorp's de-
all investment down to market. Hayes, supra note 138, at ID, col. E.
244. Some bankers are discouraged from selling debt at a discount, whether through a
debt-equity swap or outright sale, because they fear that it might spread a "contagion to the
rest of their portfolio." Curtis, supra note 138, at 572. Some view contamination as a serious
problem, although issues affecting trading of debts of financially troubled nations are viewed
differently by major accounting firms. One firm, Arthur Young & Co., P.A., does not view
contamination as a problem because it splits the portfolio into an investment and a trading
portfolio, keeping the loans in the investment portfolio at par. Price Waterhouse & Co.,
C.P.A., on the other hand, believes that if any part of a portfolio is traded, all the loans
must be marked to market. Evans, supra note 59, at 92-93.
245. Although the former method of accounting for the sale of debt did not specifically
mandate the write-down of the remaining loan portfolio of a specific country, such account-
ing procedures were generally understood to be preferred. In 1985, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) counseled banks to review their loan portfolios to
determine the adequacy of their loan loss allowance. When read in conjunction with the
AICPA recommendation that swaps should be recorded at "current fair value," many banks
believed that the sale of debt at a discount required a write-down of the remaining portfolio.
Additionally, the Comptroller of Currency issued a circular which supported this position.
Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular 200, May 22, 1985. See Roberts & Remolona,
supra note 5, at 25. Sales of public sector debt raise difficult questions concerning the attri-
bution of the loss. For example, it is unclear whether loans to a government corporation
should be cumulated with loans to the government. Id. at 26.
246. Curtis, supra note 138, at 572. See supra note 170.
247. Curtis, supra note 138, at 571.
248. Unfortunately, accountants and regulators are leaning toward recording the equity
part of the swap at the fair market value of the debt, as with debt-for-debt swaps. The
result is that the banks would suffer damage. Marton, supra note 138, at 178.
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cision to add to its loan loss reserves""9 the interests of both the
bank and the borrowing country would best be served by encourag-
ing avoidance of some of these loans through the substitution of
equity, even if acquired at a discount.
The accounting issue regarding the proper handling of the
translation of earnings into dollar equivalents arises from the gen-
eration of local currency earnings by equity assets through a debt-
equity swap. The "Emerging Issues Task Force Issue Summary"
No. 87-12 illustrates the problem of accounting in consolidated fi-
nancial statements for the credit 50 resulting from a parent partici-
pating in a debt-equity swap and the reinvestment of the proceeds
in the parent's foreign subsidiary. Assuming that a parent invested
$75 million for $100 million of local debt (redeemable at 95% of
face value) in a debt-equity swap, thereby increasing the net assets
of its subsidiary in the foreign country by $95 million in local cur-
rency, a $20 million credit arises in the parent's consolidated finan-
cial statements. The credit appears to be neither a "transaction
gain or loss," nor a "translation adjustment" as described by FASB
No. 52 because the amount does not result from a change in the
exchange rate.251 Issue Summary No. 87-12 proposes the following
alternatives in handling the credit on financial statements:2 52 (1)
no income recognition;253 (2) classification as a deferred credit; 54
249. See supra note 170.
250. No authoritative literature exists which specifically addresses this issue, although
the Financial Accounting Standards Board has provided some guidance. See FINANCIAL Ac-
COUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSLATION STATEMENT No. 52 [hereinaf-
ter FASB No. 521.
251. Id.
252. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, EMERGING ISSUES TASK
FORCE ISSUE SUMMARY: ACCOUNTING FOR FOREIGN DEBT FOR EQUITY SwAPs, ISSUE No. 87-12
(1987) [hereinafter ISSUE SUMMARY].
253. Proponents of this view argue that the foreign exchange rate used to remeasure
the subsidiary's financial statements should be discounted to properly reflect the effects of
the restrictions on the local currency's fair value. This discount is believed to equal the
amount the investor paid for the foreign loan in the secondary market. Consequently, by
discounting the exchange rate, the recorded value of the subsidiary's net assets would equal
the parent's investment in the subsidiary; therefore, no elimination of credit in consolida-
tion would be necessary. However, such a view appears inconsistent with FASB No. 52,
supra note 250. See also ISSUE SUMMARY, supra note 252, at 2.
254. Advocates of this view believe that the credit should be classified as a deferred
credit on the balance sheet due to the remoteness of ultimate distribution of the credit to
the parent based on the subsidiary's capital stock restrictions and the foreign economy's
instability. However, the deferred credit would be recognized as income when the parent
either sells its investment in the subsidiary or when the subsidiary distributes the amount to
the parent. Note that the deferred credit could also be classified as a component of stock-
holders' equity, similar to the classification of translation adjustments under FASB No. 52,
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(3) treatment as a credit excess associated with a consolidated sub-
sidiary or an equity method investee;a 5s (4) recognition as current
income; 25  or (5) recognition as income similar to local currency
used in that foreign subsidiary. 57
C. Tax Considerations
United States Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 87-
124 addresses the U.S. federal income tax consequences of a
United States commercial bank entering into debt-equity conver-
sions as part of a foreign country's program to reduce the amount
of its outstanding U.S. dollar-denominated debt.258 The following
example illustrates the federal income tax consequences of a typi-
cal debt-equity swap when a foreign firm ("Investor") purchases
U.S. dollar denominated debt ("Obligation") from a commercial
bank creditor ("Creditor").2 59 Assume Investor purchased Credi-
tor's $100 million Obligation for $75 million (fair market value in
the secondary market outside the foreign country in question)
supra note 250. See also ISSUE SUMMARY, supra note 252, at 2.
255. Based on this view, the credit would not be recognized currently as income because
it is effectively a capital contribution made by the parent to the subsidiary. The credit
would be accounted for according to its nature in the parent's consolidated financial state-
ments (e.g., the parent could allocate the credit as a component of specific accounts within
the financial statements, or account for it as if it were an unallocated credit excess that
arises in a purchase business combination if the credit could not be specifically identified).
ISSUE SUMMARY, supra note 252, at 3.
256. Those who advocate this method believe that the credit has been realized by the
consolidated entity upon the consummation of the debt-equity swap because the local cur-
rency contribution by the foreign government results in an increase in the subsidiary's cash
flow and net worth. Id.
257. Based on this view, the credit would be recognized according to the nature in
which the local currency ("LC") is required to be used by the foreign subsidiary. For exam-
ple, if the agreement requires the subsidiary to make a capital expenditure, the difference
would be amortized to income over the expected useful life of the acquired asset; likewise, if
the LCs are used to pay a portion of the subsidiary's debt, the credit should be recognized
as a gain from extinguishment of debt in the company's consolidated financial statements.
Supporters of this method believe the concepts in the AICPA's Issues Paper, Accounting for
Grants from Governments, are applicable to accounting for this credit. Id.
258. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-47 I.R.B. 5.
259. United States: Revenue Ruling on Debt/Equity, INT'L FIN. L. REv., JAN. 1988, at
44-45. The Ruling does not intend to cover all variations in the debt-equity swap proce-
dures; therefore, the specific procedures of each foreign country's capitalization program
would have to be individually reviewed when considering the U.S. income tax treatment for
U.S. banks and other U.S. taxpayers participating in such programs. Also, the Ruling does
not deal with any U.S. income tax consequences for transfers of the stock in the local corpo-
ration by the U.S. bank to its bank holding company, if required by the recently amended
Regulation K. See Spencer, supra note 214, at 45.
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which was redeemed at the central bank for $95 million in local
currency ("LC"). The central bank then credits the account of a
local corporation with the local currency and the local corporation
issues all of its capital stock to Investor. According to the Ruling,
Creditor will recognize a loss on the sale of the Obligation to Inves-
tor for $25 million, equal to the excess of the property's adjusted
basis of $100 million over the amount realized of $75 million.260
The Investor has an adjusted basis in the Obligation of $75
million, its purchase price.2 61 The remainder of the transaction will
be treated for federal income tax purposes as if Investor received
$95 LC from the central bank in exchange for the Obligation, and
then contributed the $95 LC to a corporation organized in the for-
eign country in exchange for its stock. Because the LC is consid-
ered property,262 Investor realizes a gain on the exchange of the
Obligation with the Central bank to the extent the fair market
value of the $95 LC26 exceeds Investor's adjusted basis of $75 mil-
lion.264 Investor's basis on the $95 LC is $75 million plus the gain,
if any, recognized on the exchange. As the fair market value of the
stock received from the corporation in the foreign country is pre-
sumed to equal the fair market value of the $95 LC,s66 then Inves-
260. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1987). Note that although no tax effects exist for the remain-
ing portfolio because no sale or exchange has taken place, management should theoretically
adjust its loan loss reserves to reflect market value according to GAAP. See supra note 170.
261. See I.R.C. § 1011 (1987).
262. See Rev. Rul. 74-7, 1974-1 C.B. 198.
263. Until recently the accounting profession insisted that equity interests received in
exchange for debt should be accounted for at the fair value of the debt exchanged. In June
1987, the I.R.S. modified its position and decided that the fair market value of the local
currency for purposes of debt-equity conversions is determined by taking into account all
the facts and circumstances of the exchange. This includes taking into consideration the
limitations imposed by the foreign government on Investor's use of the local currency, and
despite a free market for exchanging the local currency into U.S. dollars in transactions
unrelated to the debt conversion program. See Rev. Rul. 87-124, supra note 258; Evans,
supra note 59, at 91. The I.R.S., however, did not explain the circumstances in which the
value of the converted local proceeds exceeds the purchase price of the debt, leaving this
determination uncertain. How U.S. Corporations Can Make A Case For Tax-Free Debt
Swaps, 1988 Bus. LAT. AM. 110, 111 (based on interviews with Richard Hammer, National
Director of International Taxation, Price Waterhouse, and Dale Johnson, Chairman, Inter-
national Department, Widett, Slater & Goldman) [hereinafter Tax-Free Swaps].
264. This may provide some disincentive to some Investors who may decide that their
basis in the stock of the corporation in the foreign country should be limited to the cost of
the Obligation because of the repatriation restrictions (i.e., the converted U.S. dollar-de-
nominated debt into local currency cannot be used outside that country). However, this
merely would postpone the gain on the subsequent sale of the corporate stock.
265. Two theories have been advanced supporting the proposition that no taxable gain
should arise when participating in a debt-equity swap. First, under the "fair market value
theory," the value of the converted local currency (e.g., $95 LC) approximates the price paid
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tor's basis in this stock in exchange for the $95 LC equals the fair
market value of the $95 LC and no gain or loss is recognized.
The Revenue Ruling also describes a second fact situation. As-
sume that, instead of crediting the account of the local corpora-
tion, Creditor sells the Obligation to a domestic corporation (which
is not affiliated with Creditor) for $75 million. The Creditor, on
behalf of Investor, then delivers the Obligation to the foreign coun-
try's central bank. The central bank credits the account of the lo-
cal corporation at the central bank with the $95 LC, and the local
corporation issues all its capital stock to Investor. The same analy-
sis as in the first situation applies, except that Investor will be
treated as if it received $95 LC from the central bank in exchange
for the Obligation and then contributed the $95 LC to the local
corporation in exchange for its stock. According to the Ruling,
Creditor has a taxable loss of $25 million, equal to the difference
between its adjusted basis and the amount realized. The transac-
tion is treated as if the U.S. corporation transferred the Obligation
to the central bank, in exchange for the local currency, and then
the U.S. corporation transferred the local currency to the local cor-
poration in exchange for all of the stock of the local corporation.
The U.S. corporation recognizes a loss on the exchange of the Obli-
gation equal to the excess of Investor's adjusted basis ($100 mil-
lion) over the fair market value of the $95 LC received from the
central bank.2 6 Assuming that the U.S. corporation's basis for tax
purposes in the local currency equals the fair market value of the
stock issued by the local corporation, the U.S. corporation does not
recognize gain or loss on the exchange of the local currency for the
for the debt obligation (e.g., $75 million) because of the restrictions on the local currency.
Furthermore, proponents of this theory argue that no gain arises at the parent level because
a prudent investor would simply purchase the same debt on the secondary market if forced
to pay more than $75 million for the restricted $95 LC. Second, under the "subsidy theory,"
the currency gain (e.g., the subsidiary receives 95% of the debt redemption price in local
currency for an investment of 75% of the face value by the parent) realized by the subsidi-
ary is treated as a "subsidy, or inducement, by the government to invest." Although this
subsidy accrues to the subsidiary as a result of the favorable exchange rate, the increase in
capital (i.e., contributions from government entities to induce local investment) is not taxa-
ble under U.S. tax rules. The subsidy theory thus allows the Investor to avoid Subpart F tax
liabilities, which subjects passive income (such as foreign currency gains) earned by a con-
trolled foreign corporation at the subsidiary level to tax liability. This theory is supported
by Edwards v. The Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628 (1925), which held that a foreign govern-
ment providing a subsidy that does not require services in exchange is not taxable to the
U.S. corporation or its foreign subsidiary. See Tax-Free Swaps, supra note 263, at 110-11.
266. IssuE SUMMARY, supra note 252, at 2.
[Vol. 20:1
DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS
stock of the local corporation.267
A third and final fact situation is presented in Revenue Ruling
87-124, which is a variation of the second situation. Instead of
crediting an account of the foreign corporation, the central bank
credits an account of a U.S. corporation having the status of a
charitable organization pursuant to I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1988) and
which can use the converted local currency for charitable purposes.
Although contributors generally receive a charitable deduction
equal to the fair market value of the property on the date of the
contribution (the amount that is available for charitable use by the
donee) this ruling allows the U.S. commercial bank donor to claim
a charitable contribution deduction equal to the fair market value
of the local currency. 268 Investor also recognizes a loss on the ex-
change of the Obligation for $95 LC equal to the excess of its ad-
justed basis in the Obligation, $100 million, over the fair market
value of the $95 LC. This interpretation should help to encourage
creditor banks engaging in debt-equity swaps to donate the con-
verted proceeds to U.S. charitable organizations operating in the
developing country.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has determined that in
certain circumstances U.S. banks must reduce foreign tax credits
by the amount paid by the host country. For example, in technical
advice memorandum No. 87-18010, the IRS held that the foreign
tax credit allowable to the U.S. bank creditors to Brazil must be
reduced by the amount of the subsidy received by the Brazilian
bank even though the subsidy is passed on to Brazilian companies.
The Brazilian bank receives an interest subsidy from the Govern-
267. Id.
268. This ruling allows taxpayers to obtain the full benefit of their basis in property by
selling the property and contributing the proceeds. For example, under existing rules, if a
taxpayer contributes property with a basis exceeding its fair market value, the taxpayer is
not permitted to deduct the excess as a deduction or a loss. However, if the taxpayer sells
the property for less than its basis, the taxpayer is allowed a corresponding loss deduction,
thus obtaining the full benefit of its basis. Rev. Rul. 87-124 allows taxpayers to contribute
debt instruments issued by the foreign country (with a basis exceeding fair market value)
and receive a charitable deduction for the fair market value of the local currency, thereby
achieving this objective. The I.R.S. reaches this result by viewing the transaction as if the
bank creditor converts its external debt into a domestic obligation, and contributes the local
currency it receives from the host country's central bank to a charitable organization in the
foreign country. See Certain Charitable Contributions of Developing Nation Debts: Hear-
ings on S. 1781, Department of the Treasury Before the Subcommittee on Taxation and
Debt Management Senate Finance Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-17 (statement of
C. Eugene Steuerle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury).
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ment for a portion of the Brazilian withholding tax. 6 "
D. Risk Insurance
Direct foreign investment always carries with it a degree of
risk exceeding that of domestic investment. Information barriers,
particularly the inability to foresee the future investment climate
of a country that may have a volatile political history, 70 produce a
hesitancy among many possible investors fearful of possible expro-
priation or loss of their investment. This hesitancy cannot help but
deter direct investment through debt-equity swaps.
Risk insurance can be purchased by fearful investors to pro-
tect against many of these uncertainties associated with invest-
ment in financially troubled Latin American debtor nations. Two
mechanisms are of particular importance for American investors,
although they have at this point been limited for different reasons.
First, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which
has served as the key federal agency for encouraging mutually-ben-
eficial American business investment in the world's developing na-
tions, provides risk insurance for "new investment" that meets its
statutory conditions. Second, the Multilateral Investment Guaran-
tee Agency (MIGA) represents a multinational attempt to en-
courage investment among its members through similar insurance
guaranties. However, the United States Senate has not yet ratified
American membership in the Agency. Both of these programs will
assist in fostering foreign investment flows to developing countries
for productive purposes. They are expected to help close confi-
dence gaps between investors and developing host countries, and
reduce barriers to investment, and thus to stimulate the flow of
resources to developing countries far beyond the volume of the in-
vestments they actually guarantee. 71
OPIC performs two functions related to the facilitation of di-
rect investment in developing countries. Not only does it insure
U.S. investments against the political risks of inconvertibility, ex-
269. Memorandum on Brazilian Loans, 1987 INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1987, at 41, 42.
270. For a useful survey of the techniques by which one may attempt to manage politi-
cal and investment risk, see Stobaugh, How To Analyze Foreign Investment Climates,
HARv. Bus. REV. 100 (Sept.-Oct. 1969).
271. For a survey of the MIGA plan, see Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of For-
eign Investment and the Relevance of a Multilateral Guarantee Scheme, 21 INT'L LAW. 671
(1987); Voss, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Status, Mandate, Concept,
Features, Implications, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 5 (1987).
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propriation, and war, but it also provides credit facilities that in-
clude direct lending and a loan guarantee program. 2 OPIC's
credit facilities have been very active in Latin America, lending
close to 40% of their funds to the region."'
On the insurance side, OPIC only issues insurance to "eligible
investors," defined as U.S. citizens, corporations, partnerships,
business partnerships with at least 50% U.S. ownership, or foreign
corporations, partnerships, or business associations which are at
least 95% owned by other forms of "eligible investors." It will also
cover no more than 90% of an investment plus attributable earn-
ings, placing the burden on the investor to bear the risk of at least
10% of the investment. Investors must secure the insurance from
OPIC before the investment has been made but there is no fixed
form the investment must take in order to be eligible for OPIC;
equity investment loans, and goods and services under contract, for
example, are all eligible for insurance.274
OPIC's credit facilities, as noted, include direct loans and loan
guarantees. Direct loans are issued only for investment projects
sponsored by, or including, U.S. small businesses, with a maximum
loan amount of $6 million, and terms ranging from five to 12
years.21 5 OPIC's loan guaranties, under which OPIC guarantees
third party loans, are issued to either U.S. lenders having over
50% U.S. ownership or to foreign lending institutions that are at
least 95% U.S. owned. 6 Corporations which may not be eligible
for direct loans may utilize these guaranties, which may go as high
as $50 million per project. OPIC works with the lender in structur-
ing the financing and charges the borrower an annual guarantee fee
of 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent on the outstanding balance. 7
Before one can participate in either program, however, OPIC
requires that the following five conditions be met:2 78
1) the investor's project be a new venture or an expansion of
an existing enterprise;
272. See generally Overseas Private Investment Corporation (information guide pub-
lished by OPIC) [hereinafter OPIC Guide]; Keslar, OPIC's Brave But Risky New World,
EUROMONEY, Aug. 1987, at 157; OPIC Financing Programs Offer Loans and Guarantees for
Hard-to-Fund Projects, 1987 Bus. LAT. AM. 91 [hereinafter Loans and Guarantees].
273. See Loans and Guarantees, supra note 272.
274. OPIC Guide, supra note 272, at 10.
275. Loans and Guarantees, supra note 273.
276. OPIC Guide, supra note 272, at 10.
277. Loans and Guarantees, supra note 273.
278. OPIC Guide, supra note 272, at 10.
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2) the project be located in a developing country where OPIC
operates;
3) the project assist in the social and economic development of
the host country;
4) the project be approved by the host government; and
5) the project be consistent with the economic interests of the
United States and not have a significant adverse effect on the U.S.
economy or U.S. employment.
These overall eligibility criteria, especially the first require-
ment of a "new venture," add some uncertainty regarding OPIC
participation in debt-equity swaps that has yet to be resolved.
Without any planned expansion after the initial investment is
made, it becomes very unclear whether OPIC would support in-
vestment in an existing plant through a debt-equity swap.
MIGA is designed to foster the flow of investments to and
among its developing member countries by according foreign inves-
tors guarantee protection against non-commercial risks, by provid-
ing technical and advisory services to requesting member govern-
ments, and by facilitating policy cooperation among its member
governments to improve and stabilize investment climates.27 9
MIGA's role is to alleviate perceptions of non-commercial risk as
barriers to the flow of capital and technology to developing coun-
tries.2 80 The ultimate objective is to facilitate consideration of in-
vestments in developing countries on the same footing as invest-
ments in developed countries, i.e., to encourage investors to
allocate investment resources solely on the basis of relative rates of
return.28 "The critical distinction between MIGA and existing
public or private insurance schemes is that it would provide a
mechanism for monitoring agreements and imposing sanctions in
cases of violations by contracting parties." 82
Eligible investments include new288 equity investments and
non-equity forms of direct investment having terms of at least
three years. The investor's return depends substantially on the
279. Voss, supra note 271, at 5.
280. Id. at B.
281. Id. at 8-9.
282. LESSARD & WILLIAMSON, supra note 12, at 39.
283. Only new investment will qualify for coverage, i.e., investment that has been made
or irrevocably committed before registration with MIGA of an application for a guarantee.
Voss, supra note 271, at 11.
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production, revenue, or profits of the investment project.28" Eligi-
ble investors include member countries and investors from member
countries. 86
Any coordinated effort by the U.S. policymakers to encourage
direct investment in lesser developed nations and reduce their
countries' indebtedness must make every attempt to make risk in-
surance available to potential investors at a reasonable price. To-
ward this end, OPIC's revaluation must be amended to specifically
include debt-equity swaps within the definition of "new invest-
ment." U.S. participation in MIGA should also be made an imme-
diate priority.86
VII. CONCLUSION
Two undisputed propositions emerge from the vast literature
discussing the Latin American debt crisis. First, no real solution
can neglect the role that domestic growth must play in the rejuve-
nation of the financially troubled Latin American countries. Sec-
ond, a major commitment must be made by the developing coun-
tries to both promote this growth in the debtor countries and to
reduce the debt which saddles the debtors and threatens the finan-
cial community within the developed country.
Debt-equity swaps will not, on their own, produce a miracu-
lous turnaround in the economies of the Latin American debtor
nations. Although debt-equity swaps have surged in popularity as
the most palatable choice within the debtor bank's menu of debt
restructuring options, they fail to squarely address the central
problem of generating new investment in Latin America. To the
extent that they may generate some direct investment in Latin
America, however, their use should be encouraged by U.S. policy-
makers, who must be particularly mindful of the developed coun-
tries' prominent role in the search for a solution to the debt crisis.
This plea to American policymakers should in no way be construed
284. Voss, supra note 271, at 10-11. These conditions reflect MIGA's focus on invest-
ment capable of generating its own dividend and service payments.
285. Investments must be made in the territory of a developing member country and an
investor must be a national of a member country or, in the case of a corporate investor,
either be incorporated in and have its principal place of business in a member country, or
the majority of its capital must be owned by nationals of member countries. Id.
286. The U.S. still has not joined MIGA. However, as of late April 1988 it had finally
received enough signatures from participating countries to make it operational. See Man-
agement Alert, 1988 Bus. LAT. AM. 136.
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as being blind to the crucial role that the debtor countries them-
selves play in the promotion of growth. In no instance is this role
better exhibited than by the willingness of some countries to de-
sign debt-equity swap programs and investment regimes that en-
courage investment by recognizing the demands of the market-
place. It cannot be stated strongly enough that both sides must be
willing to work together to fashion relief that is in the best inter-
ests of the debtor country; these "best interests" have a tendency
to produce beneficial results among both debtor and creditor.
On balance, properly structured debt-equity swaps are benefi-
cial to debtor nations, bank creditors, and investors, and should
thus be encouraged. They are the most important means yet devel-
oped for liquidating debt and stimulating new investment, both of
which are needed to revive economic growth. United States ac-
counting and banking regulators should promote these debt-equity
swaps by encouraging U.S. banks, which hold the majority of the
Latin American financially troubled loans, to sell their debt in
these swap transactions. Regulators should also continue to liber-
alize regulations which may discourage banks from directly engag-
ing in debt-equity swaps through direct investment. Debt-equity
swaps are not a panacea; however, they are capable of eliminating
an estimated ten percent of Latin America's debt and, along with
other debt reduction alternatives, can only help to ease and even-
tually cure the unabated debt crisis.
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